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Venture development funds (“VDFs”) are products of state and local
government law that use public funds to invest in local start-ups, in the
hope that these companies will then attract venture capital investment.  Ex-
isting analysis by legal scholars largely assumes that establishing a private
venture capital market is essential to encouraging entrepreneurship.  This
article challenges that assumption.  It argues that VDFs and other policies
focused on encouraging venture capital are outmoded and inconsistent
with the ultimate economic development goals of state and local
governments.
In many industries, entrepreneurs can now get by with less capital be-
cause the cost of developing a product is rapidly declining due to techno-
logical advances (e.g., cloud computing) and other developments (e.g., the
ability to market an app through Apple’s App Store).  But venture capital
funds continue to seek out investments in a small number of industries that
still require a great deal of capital, such as biotech firms trying to develop
new drugs.  This narrow focus is inconsistent with the advice of economic
development experts to pursue industry-neutral policies that broadly en-
courage entrepreneurial activity in all of its forms.  Also, policies oriented
towards venture capital may undermine goals of employment diversity and
stability because companies seeking venture capital pursue particularly
high-risk business strategies that often fail.
This article recommends that state and local governments shift their
policies to encourage, or at least not hinder, alternatives to venture capital.
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INTRODUCTION
When articulating his economic agenda in 2011, President Obama and
members of his cabinet took to the road to demonstrate a commitment to
entrepreneurship.  But their first stop was not Palo Alto, Boston, or other
established high-tech centers.  Instead, they headed to Cleveland, Ohio to
appear with the chief executive officer of an economic development initia-
tive named JumpStart.1 JumpStart is an example of a “venture develop-
ment fund” or “VDF.”2  It invests in Cleveland-area start-up companies
using funds contributed by the State of Ohio.  Jumpstart wants to produce
more Cleveland-based companies that are viable candidates for subse-
quent venture capital (or “VC”) investment.3
The President’s JumpStart visit symbolizes the elevated status of ven-
ture capital as a public policy initiative.  In numerous ways, law and policy
favors venture capital as a form of finance.  The industry has roots in sig-
nificant public subsidy programs, typically referred to as “state-sponsored
venture capital.”4  Since the late 1950s, the Small Business Administration
has funneled billions of dollars in public funds to start-up companies
through privately-managed small business investment companies
(“SBICs”),5 which some observers credit with providing a template for
private venture capital.6  By 1986, most states had established funds dedi-
cated to investing in local start-ups or set aside public pension dollars for
1. John Dearborn, President Spreads Innovation Agenda to Middle America, HUF-
FINGTON POST (Mar. 2, 2011, 1:35 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/john-dearborn/
obama-spreads-innovation-_b_829935.html (“By bringing the President, five cabinet and two
senior administration members to a Midwest city whose venture capital investment growth
managed to outpace much of the country in 2010, the White House has shone a spotlight on
the potential of entrepreneurship for economic recovery.”); Sabrina Eaton, President Barack
Obama to Tout Entrepreneurship Next Week in Cleveland, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER (Feb.
16, 2011, 12:01 AM), http://blog.cleveland.com/open_impact/print.html?entry=/2011/02/presi
dent_barack_obama_to_tout.html.
2. See, e.g., About, NEW ORLEANS STARTUP FUND, http://www.neworleansstartup
fund.com/about/ (last visited April 12, 2013) (follow “faq” hyperlink) (listing JumpStart as an
example of a venture development fund).
3. JumpStart’s website highlights its focus on encouraging VC financing in the region.
It includes in its mission statement: “accelerat[ing] the growth of early-stage businesses and
ideas into venture-ready companies.”  It produces annual reports monitoring levels of VC
investing in the region, and it measures its success in part by the amount of follow-on funding
obtained by its portfolio companies. See Our History, JUMPSTART, INC., http://www.jump
startinc.org/aboutus/ourhistory.aspx (last visited Aug. 13, 2012).
4. In this context, “state” does not distinguish between federal, state, or local govern-
ment.  It simply denotes use of public funds.
5. Michael B. Staebler, An Overview Of The Small BUS. Investment Company Pro-
gram, PEPPER HAMILTON LLP (April 2010), http://www.nasbic.org/resource/resmgr/Legal_Is
sues/pepper_hamilton_overview.pdf (“Over the years, SBICs have provided $56 billion of
funding to more than 107,000 businesses, including well-known companies such as Apple
Computer, Federal Express, Cray Computers, Callaway Golf and Outback Steakhouse.”).
6. JOSH LERNER, BOULEVARD OF BROKEN DREAMS: WHY PUBLIC EFFORTS TO
BOOST ENTREPRENEURSHIP HAVE FAILED — AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 10 (2009) (“[T]he
Small Business Investment Company (SBIC) program in the United States led to the forma-
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privately managed VC funds committing to invest locally.7  Managers of
VC funds enjoy regulatory exemptions at the state and federal level.8  Lo-
cal governments provide office space to companies targeting VC funding
and give tax credits to investors in those companies.9  This article refers to
these types of VC-friendly policies as “venture development.”
Despite the prominence of venture development, one can detect dis-
content with the VC model by listening closely to key players.  Gatherings
of entrepreneurs feature presentations on “what’s next” for funding start-
ups.10  One angel-investor website includes links to over 40 articles on the
topic “The VC Model Is Broken.”11  In a 2009 Kauffman Foundation re-
port, Paul Kedrosky, a VC manager and frequent commentator on the
industry, wrote that venture capital “has become conflated with entrepre-
neurship in the popular imagination as well as in policy circles, with the
result being a widespread and incorrect belief that venture capital is a nec-
essary and sufficient condition in driving growth entrepreneurship.”12
Underlying this discontent is a perception that entrepreneurship and
venture capital are heading in opposite directions.  Changes in technology
and business processes allow entrepreneurs to operate with less capital.13
Entrepreneurs can now develop and market products without expensive
equipment (for example, through cloud computing services) or proprietary
sales and distributions systems (for example, through platforms like Ap-
ple’s App Store).14  At the same time, VC funds are getting larger and
tion of the infrastructure for much of the modern venture capital industry.”); Darian M.
Ibrahim, Financing the Next Silicon Valley, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 717, 740-741 (2010).
7. PETER K. EISINGER, THE RISE OF THE ENTREPRENEURIAL STATE: STATE AND LO-
CAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 249-60 (1988).
8. For example, Section 203(l) of the Investment Advisers Act (enacted as part of the
Dodd-Frank Act) exempts VC funds from federal investment adviser registration require-
ments. See also Goodwin Proctor LLP, Massachusetts Adopts Changes to Investment Adviser
Registration Exemptions, FINANCIAL SERVICES ALERT (Feb. 21, 2012), http://www.goodwin
procter.com/Dodd-Frank/Publications/Newsletter%20Articles/Financial%20Services%20Ar
ticles/2012_02/21_03.aspx (discussing a state-level exemption).
9. E.g., NAT’L GOVERNORS ASS’N CTR. FOR BEST PRACTICES, STATE STRATEGIES TO
PROMOTE ANGEL INVESTMENT FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH (2008), available at http://www.
angelcapitalassociation.org/data/Documents/Public%20Policy/State/NGA%20Issue%20Brief
%20Angel%20Investment.pdf (discussing tax credit programs); INCUBATOR & WORK-
PLACES, New York City Economic Development Corporation, available at http://www.ny
cedc.com/service/incubators-workspaces (last visited Aug. 14, 2012) (describing incubators
and workspaces established by NYCEDC, an economic development agency of New York
City).
10. Taylor Davidson, Venture Capital Is Growing Up. What’s Next?, http://panelpicker.
sxsw.com/ideas/view/13402 (login credentials required) (describing proposed and past panel
discussions at the SXSW (South-by-Southwest) festival).
11. The VC Model Is Broken, ANGEL BLOG, http://www.angelblog.net/The_VC_Model
_is_Broken.html (last visited Aug. 14, 2012).
12. PAUL KEDROSKY, RIGHT-SIZING THE U.S. VENTURE CAPITAL INDUSTRY 1 (2009),
http://www.kauffman.org/uploadedfiles/usventcap061009r1.pdf.
13. Infra text accompanying notes 176-89.
14. Id.
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have incentives to invest more in each company.15  With these larger in-
vestments come correspondingly higher expectations for the companies in
which they invest.16
These diverging trends in venture capital and entrepreneurship war-
rant reconsideration of a fundamental question:  Is creating more candi-
dates for VC financing the right economic development goal?  To date,
legal scholars have primarily analyzed state-sponsored venture capital
from a financial-contracting perspective, which helpfully explains VC con-
tracts and assesses governments’ ability to “engineer” a VC market.17  But
for the most part, the financial-contracting analysis does not focus on
whether venture capital is the right vehicle for economic development in
the first place.18  Answering that question requires looking closely at what
subnational (state and local) governments are trying to achieve when they
incorporate VDFs and other venture development policies into their eco-
nomic development efforts.
The broader goals of VDFs go beyond potential investment returns,
tax revenues, technologies, or jobs directly associated with any particular
start-up company.  VDFs and other venture development initiatives are
part of a sea change in economic development strategy.  Increasingly, legal
scholars, voters, and subnational governments are skeptical of traditional
“smokestack-chasing” subsidies that try to influence the location decision
of a single firm or narrow industry by subsidizing the cost of local facili-
ties.19  Instead, subnational governments are trying to create more sustain-
able demand for local investment by playing a supporting role in the
emergence of market-driven “agglomeration economies.”20
Agglomeration economies arise when businesses gain competitive ad-
vantages by physically locating close to other businesses in related fields.21
15. Infra text accompanying notes 196–213.
16. Id.
17. See, e.g., Ibrahim supra note 6 (discussing angel investor groups and state-spon-
sored venture capital); Dominick DiSabatino, State Venture Capital Funds, ST. TAX NOTES,
July 9, 2012, at 95 (noting both political and efficiency concerns). See generally, e.g., Ronald
Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons from the American Experience, 55
STAN. L. REV. 1067 (2003) (discussing state-sponsored VC programs in Europe, Israel, and
South America).
18. Darian Ibrahim is one scholar who has considered whether alternatives to venture
capital have advantages in regions outside of Silicon Valley. In a valuable article appearing in
this issue, Ibrahim considers whether gains from innovation could be more broadly distrib-
uted geographically if entrepreneurs declined VC financing. See generally, Darian M.
Ibrahim, Should Angel-backed Start-ups Decline Venture Capital?, 2 MICH. J. PRIVATE EQ-
UITY & VENTURE CAP. L. 251 (2013). While Professor Ibrahim’s article discusses many of the
same trends as this article—such as alternatives to venture capital and declining costs of
entrepreneurship—it focuses primarily on specific contract-design challenges for start-ups,
rather than theories of economic development.
19. Infra text accompanying notes 131–53.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 154–65.
21. See RICHARD FLORIDA, THE RISE OF THE CREATIVE CLASS AND HOW IT’S
TRANSFORMING WORK, LEISURE, COMMUNITY AND EVERYDAY LIFE 219-234 (2002) (dis-
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MPE\2-2\MPE201.txt unknown Seq: 6 13-JUN-13 13:11
200 Michigan Journal of Private Equity & Venture Capital Law [Vol. 2:195
There is mounting empirical evidence confirming the long-held belief that
geographic proximity of competitors, specialized workers in related indus-
tries, suppliers, and customers increases a company’s and economic re-
gion’s productivity and capacity to innovate.22  What is less clear is why
productivity increases where the obvious reasons for co-location—reduced
transportation costs, ease of communication, and proximity to natural en-
dowments—are irrelevant or diminishing in importance.23  For example,
vineyards cluster in Napa Valley for obvious reasons: suitability of soil and
weather for growing wine grapes. But why do wineries, barrel makers,
wine-related publications, sellers of agricultural products, and related edu-
cational programs continue to locate near the grapes when there are less
expensive locations, transportation costs are rapidly declining, and tech-
nology permits ubiquitous and instantaneous communication?  Even more
striking, why do the very technology firms that made the virtual workplace
possible still cluster in pricey Silicon Valley?  Prominent explanations of
agglomeration emphasize the attractiveness of business clusters to talented
workers, the cultural attributes and lifestyle amenities that attract workers
and entrepreneurs to a cluster location, and the tendency for valuable in-
formation (such as technical expertise) to spread throughout a cluster.24
What role do VDFs play in agglomeration-based economic develop-
ment?  Whatever the precise explanation for the super-charged economic
performance of agglomeration economies, leading commentators agree
that agglomeration effects are sufficiently complex and idiosyncratic that
governments should avoid efforts to overtly engineer them by recruiting
specific firms through traditional location incentives.  These commentators
worry that governments will make errors in such efforts and distort mar-
ket-based agglomeration forces, to the detriment of the recruited firms
and possibly the local economy.25  Proponents of agglomeration-based ec-
onomic development therefore recommend industry-neutral policies, such
as providing goods and services that benefit broad segments of the local
economy.26  At first blush, VDFs may appear consistent with this principle
of industry neutrality because they help establish investing practices and
conventions that can be used widely.  By dealing with VDFs, local entre-
cussing agglomeration effects and proposed causes); Michael E. Porter, Location, Competi-
tion, and Economic Development: Local Clusters in a Global Economy, 14 ECON. DEV. Q.,
15, 21-25 (2000), [hereinafter Porter on Economic Development] (discussing the role of indus-
try clusters in producing agglomeration effects); Michael E. Porter, Clusters and the New
Economics of Competition, 76 HARV. BUS. REV., Nov.–Dec. 1998, at 77, 78  [hereinafter
Porter on New Economics].
22. See infra text accompanying notes 121, 160, and 162 (discussing empirical studies
of the effects of agglomeration).
23. See infra notes 98–99 (discussing the continuing clustering of economic activity
despite lowering transportation and communication costs).
24. See infra text accompanying notes 104–25 (summarizing the human capital, crea-
tive capital, and cluster explanations of agglomeration effects).
25. See infra text accompanying notes 144–45.
26. See infra text accompanying notes 153–162.
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preneurs, investors, accountants, and lawyers are exposed to standard in-
vestment terms, due diligence practices, and other expertise that facilitate
later financing transactions with parties other than the VDF.27  In other
words, the best argument for VDFs, in light of their role in agglomeration
efforts, is that they help establish broadly beneficial financial infrastruc-
ture that no private actor has adequate incentive to create on its own.
This article, however, critiques this apparent justification for VDFs.
Because VDFs rely on a VC model, they may not establish the right finan-
cial infrastructure for most jurisdictions.  In the current environment, fi-
nancing methods geared towards more capital-efficient business models
may provide broader-based and more reliable benefits to entrepreneurs,
local investors, and employees.  This argument proceeds in four parts.
Part I describes how VDFs differ from previous state-sponsored ven-
ture capital programs: they are generally more local in scope and provide
funding earlier in a company’s life cycle than traditional venture capital
(though with the expectation that companies will later seek venture capi-
tal).  Part I also explains why the most common rationales for subsidizing
entrepreneurial finance—the jobs and innovative technologies historically
produced by venture-backed companies—do not provide an economic jus-
tification for subsidies by subnational governments.
Because these conventional explanations for venture development fall
short, Part II looks deeper into the role of VDFs in economic develop-
ment efforts by subnational governments.  It describes how many jurisdic-
tions have turned to agglomeration-based development due to the
difficulty of transitioning to a knowledge-based economy.  It also describes
efforts by agglomeration theorists to distance themselves from traditional
location incentives by espousing the principle of industry neutrality.  It
concludes by laying out the apparent justification for VDFs described
above: VDFs may produce broad positive spillover effects by establishing
financial infrastructure.
Part III is this article’s main contribution.  It critiques the arguments in
favor of VDFs identified in Part II by focusing on the diverging paths of
venture capital and capital-efficient entrepreneurship described above.
Part III.A focuses on the “homerun mentality” of VC investing.  VC
funds invest in entrepreneurs who try to achieve an “exit” transaction
through an initial public offering (“IPO”) or acquisition by an established
firm.  This emphasis on exit is a key innovation of VC contracts because it
helps mitigate the primary obstacles to financing the efforts of entrepre-
neurs: problems of uncertainty, information asymmetry, and agency costs.
But when VC funds target particularly ambitious exit goals with corre-
spondingly high risk and long time frames, economic development goals
may be frustrated.  Employees of failed companies may find it difficult to
find new employment opportunities.  Entrepreneurs who show signs of
27. See infra Part II D.
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success may not have the ability to recycle their talents and capital through
earlier and more modest exits.
Part III.B focuses on venture capital’s narrow industry focus and its
effects on agglomerative efficiency.  There are reasons to worry that ven-
ture development policies benefit such a small slice of entrepreneurial ac-
tivity that they will become the functional equivalent of firm- or industry-
specific location subsidies.  Although such traditional subsidies are not
necessarily agglomeratively inefficient, proponents of agglomeration strat-
egies express concerns that narrow subsidies increase the chances of error
by government officials.  This may result in wasted resources and crowding
out of more agglomeratively-efficient economic activity.
Part IV considers financing methods that might be viable alternatives
to venture capital.  It then considers the program-design implications of
those trends in light of this article’s critiques of current VDFs.  It con-
cludes that program design can substantially mitigate concerns based on
high-risk exits but is less likely to address concerns based on narrow indus-
try focus. Finally, this article identifies additional theoretical questions for
future research by legal scholars.
I. THE PUZZLE OF VDFS
A. What Are VDFs?
VDFs are a type of state-sponsored venture capital that has gained
popularity in recent years.  VDFs can be found in Cleveland,28 New Orle-
28. Cleveland’s JumpStart fund is a division of a 501(c)(3) organization established in
2003. See Charitable Purposes, JUMPSTART, INC., http://www.jumpstartinc.org/AboutUs/chari
tablepurpose.aspx (last visited Aug. 14, 2012) (discussing 501(c)(3) status).  In addition to
other fundraising sources, it has received over $16 million from a state economic develop-
ment agency for the purpose of job growth within identified counties in the Cleveland area.
Our Community Commitment, JUMPSTART, INC., http://www.jumpstartinc.org/aboutus/com
munity.aspx; (discussing funding sources).  It seeks to make investments in companies head-
quartered in the region that have a unique idea, a $1 billion or larger potential market, and
management that is committed to growth and an exit by IPO or merger. Our Funds, JUMP-
START, INC., http://www.jumpstartinc.org/entrepreneursupport/funds/ourfunds.aspx (discuss-
ing desired attributes of portfolio companies).
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ans,29 New York City,30 Pittsburgh,31 and Portland, Oregon.32  The pri-
mary features of a VDF are best illustrated by a recent example.
In 2010, the mayor of Portland announced a $500,000 contribution to
the Portland Seed Fund.33  The fund ultimately raised a total of $2 million
(including contributions from neighboring cities, state government enti-
ties, and private investors) in its first year for investments in local start-up
companies.34  Paid managers—including a former VC manager and a local
business consultant—select which companies receive funding, coaching,
and business advice from the fund.35  Although there are very few explicit
29. The New Orleans Startup Fund is a 501(c)(3) organization that began with total
capital of $3.9 million from a state economic development authority, a federal grant, and
private donations.  It seeks companies that are headquartered in and committed to creating
jobs in the New Orleans area, have ideas capable of attracting traditional VC financing, and
have a “clear vision” to grow the company’s business to $20 million within five years. See
About, NEW ORLEANS STARTUP FUND, http://www.neworleansstartupfund.com/about/ (last
visited Aug. 14, 2012) (discussing 501(c)(3) status and desired attributes of companies); See
also, Jennifer Larino, Startup Fund Aims to Promote Growth, Attract New Business to
NOLA, NEW ORLEANS CITY BUS. (Dec. 7, 2010), http://neworleanscitybusiness.com/blog/
2010/12/07/startup-fund-aims-to-promote-growth-attract-new-business-to-nola/ (discussing
source of funding).
30. The NYC Entrepreneurs Fund started with $3 million in public funds and $19 mil-
lion of private capital raised by the professional investment firm hired to manage the fund.
Joseph De Avila, New York City Launches Investment Fund for Tech Startups, WALL ST. J.,
May 26, 2010, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487033419045752668
43435961622.html.
31. Pittsburgh’s Innovation Works was established in 1999 through collaboration be-
tween Ben Franklin Technology Partners, a state economic development agency, and private
foundations. In recent years it has invested approximately $5 million per year in local compa-
nies. INNOVATION WORKS, http://www.innovationworks.org/AboutUs/FAQs/tabid/92/Default
.aspx (last visited Aug. 14, 2012). Innovation Works targets companies with fewer than 50
employees with a proprietary technology that “addresses high-potential emerging and grow-
ing markets.” Funding for Entrepreneurs, INNOVATION WORKS, http://www.innovationworks.
org/SeedFund/tabid/99/Default.aspx (last visited Aug. 14, 2012).
32. PORTLAND SEED FUND, http://www.portlandseedfund.com/ (last visited April 12,
2013).
33. Mike Rogoway, Portland Mayor Promises $500k for Small Bizs & Startups, OR.
LIVE BLOG (Feb. 5, 2011), http://blog.oregonlive.com/siliconforest/2010/02/portland_mayor_
promises_500k_f.html.
34. Mike Rogoway, Portland Seed Fund Tops 100 Applicants as Tonight’s Deadline
Nears, OR. LIVE BLOG (June 6, 2011, 4:21 PM), http://blog.oregonlive.com/siliconforest/2011/
06/portland_seed_fund_tops_100_ap.html.
35. Mike Rogoway, Portland Seed Fund Names Managers, OR. LIVE BLOG (Aug. 19,
2010, 6:37 AM), http://blog.oregonlive.com/siliconforest/2010/08/portland_seed_fund_names
_manag.html.  Although VDFs use public money, VDFs are not typically managed by public
officials. Jumpstart, for example, is managed by an executive director with investment man-
agement experience. About Us, JUMPSTART, INC., http://www.jumpstartinc.org/en/AboutUs/
whoweare/seniorleadership/rayleach.aspx (last visited Aug. 14, 2012). The New Orleans Star-
tup Fund is managed by a full-time management team and a board consisting of private
business people and one public official. About, NEW ORLEANS STARTUP FUND, http://www.
neworleansstartupfund.com/about/ (last visited Aug. 14, 2012). The NYC Entrepreneurship
Fund is managed by a private investment firm. Supra note 30.
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eligibility requirements, it is clear the fund targets entrepreneurs who
dream big. Nail salons and taxicab operators need not apply.  In start-up
company jargon, the fund seeks “scalable” businesses that are suitable for
follow-on investment by VC firms.36
Ideally, one of these companies will have a successful exit in the form
of an IPO or acquisition by a larger firm.  But it will be tough going for the
fund to make money.  Startups fail at high rates.37  Although Oregon com-
panies attract moderate levels of VC investment, the region is a far cry
from entrepreneurial hubs like Silicon Valley, Boston, or Seattle.38  It has
been over seven years since an Oregon technology start-up went public.39
The goal of the fund, however, is not to provide direct investment re-
turns to the city.  Rather, the fund is part of a larger effort to create jobs
and strengthen the local software industry.40  In fact, officials believe the
city is legally prohibited from receiving a direct return on its investment in
the fund.41  State constitutional provisions, enacted long ago in response
to imprudent public investments in railroads, prohibit Oregon cities from
holding stock in private corporations.42  Accordingly, the city structured
its contribution to the fund as a grant, with any investment returns being
recycled into the program rather than returning to the public fisc.43
36. On its website, the fund expresses a preference for “highly scalable companies with
high-growth potential.” Our Strategy, PORTLAND SEED FUND, http://portlandseedfund.com/
about-us/ (last visited April 12, 2013). The fund expressly contemplates that these companies
may require later investment by venture capital or traditional angel investors. FAQs, PORT-
LAND SEED FUND, http://portlandseedfund.com/faqs/ (last visited April 12, 2013) (“We will
have reserve capital for follow on financing in those companies who make good progress, but
in most cases not more than about $100,000 from us over the life of the company. Most
companies who need additional capital will need to raise money from other angels or VCs.”).
37. See infra note 202 (discussing the failure rates of companies that have already
achieved angel or VC financing). The failure rates discussed in note 202 do not include the
presumably significant number of companies that never obtain VC or angel funding.
38. Infra note 54 (discussing the amount of VC investment in Oregon in 2011). R
39. Mike Rogoway, Oregon’s Startup Community by The Numbers:  Tiny, But Strong,
OR. LIVE BLOG (July 7, 2012, 10:52 PM), http://www.oregonlive.com/silicon-forest/index.ssf/
2012/07/oregons_startup_community_by_t.html.
40. See Mike Rogoway, Startups Play Waiting Game While Portland Seed Fund Evalu-
ates Flood of Applicants, OR. LIVE BLOG (June 12, 2011, 4:53 PM), http://www.oregonlive.
com/business/index.ssf/2011/06/startups_play_waiting_game_whi.html (“The seed fund is the
centerpiece of Portland’s effort to nurture a regional software economy, one of four key
industry clusters targeted for growth (the others are athletic and outdoor apparel, clean tech
and advanced manufacturing.”)).
41. Mike Rogoway, Portland Picks Team to Oversee $500,000 for The City’s Startups,
OR. LIVE BLOG (June 4, 2010, 9:37 AM), http://blog.oregonlive.com/siliconforest/2010/06/
portland_picks_team_to_oversee.html.
42. OR. CONST. art. XI, § 9 (“No county, city, town or other municipal corporation, by
vote of its citizens, or otherwise, shall become a stockholder in any . . . corporation . . .”).
43. Rogoway, supra note 41.
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B. What is Unique About VDFs?
Two core characteristics distinguish VDFs from other forms of state-
sponsored venture capital: (1) they are established by subnational govern-
ments to benefit specific metropolitan areas, and (2) individual invest-
ments are structured as relatively small angel investments, which then
serve as stepping stones for subsequent VC financing.
Local Focus
VDFs are sponsored by collections of municipal governments, state ec-
onomic development agencies (special-purpose divisions of state govern-
ment), nonprofit organizations, and other private parties.44  While there is
a long history of state-sponsored venture capital at the subnational level,
VDFs are narrower in focus than many prior subnational programs that
had a state-wide focus or sought to disperse funds to economically dis-
tressed regions of a state.45  VDFs typically target economic development
in specified metropolitan areas such as Northeast Ohio (roughly, the
Cleveland metropolitan area) or Southwest Pennsylvania (roughly, the
Pittsburgh metropolitan area).
State-sponsored venture capital has not always been primarily a func-
tion of subnational governments.  Historically, state-sponsored venture
capital was largely conducted by the federal government though the SBIC
program described in the introduction to this article. Although that pro-
gram still operates today, it was an awkward fit for high-growth start-up
companies.  The program provided funds to SBICs through debentures
that required SBICs to repay the Small Business Administration (“SBA”)
on a fixed schedule, while start-up companies do not produce investment
returns until an exit event, the timing of which is difficult to predict. Some
VC pioneers made do with this less-than-ideal debenture funding.46  How-
ever, the VC industry eventually matured, rules governing the investing
activities of pension managers and other fiduciaries changed, and signifi-
cant private sources of funds became available to VC managers from insti-
tutional investors.47  In 1992, the SBA developed a “participating
preferred” program that better met the needs of high growth start-ups, but
the program was discontinued in 2004 due to substantial losses in the in-
vestment portfolio.48  The principal design flaw of the participating pre-
ferred program was that it capped the SBA’s returns for each successful
44. Supra notes 28–32 (discussing examples of VDFs).
45. EISINGER, supra note 7, at 241–56 (discussing a variety of early state-sponsored VC
programs with either a state-wide focus or a preference for investing in economically dis-
tressed portions of a state).
46. Ibrahim, supra note 6, at 740–41.
47. EISINGER, supra note 7, at 256 (discussing changes in the prudent man rule).
48. Staebler, supra note 5, at 2–3.
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SBIC at modest levels but exposed the SBA to the full extent of losses
from failed SBICs.49
Today, there is no substantial federal program in the United States for
providing VC or angel-style financing to start-up companies.  The SBA
recently announced a new SBIC program aimed at high growth start-ups,
but this program continues to use debenture financing that may not be
compatible with high growth start-ups.50  As a result, current federal sup-
port of start-up companies comes mostly in the form of grants targeted at
specific research and development projects, not general financing for
working capital.51
Pre-Venture Capital
Many state-sponsored venture capital programs attempt to provide fi-
nancing at the same point in a company’s lifecycle as venture capital.  For
example, as early as the 1980s, states with historically low VC activity be-
gan placing public employee pension funds in privately managed VC funds
that promised to invest within the state.52  Similarly, governments in na-
tions without established VC markets often turn to state-sponsored ven-
ture capital in the hope of catalyzing a domestic VC market.53
VDFs, in contrast, recognize that established VC firms headquartered
in Silicon Valley, Boston, or other VC hubs are willing to invest outside of
their immediate vicinity,54 and so VDFs do not try to be a local substitute
for venture capital.  Instead, they typically provide angel financing, which
49. Private Equity for Small Firms: The Importance of the Participating Securities Pro-
gram: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Small Bus. 109th Cong. 37, 33–36  (2005) [hereinafter
Participating Securities Hearings] (Statement of Hector V. Baretto, Adm’r, U.S. Small Bus.
Admin.).
50. See Russ Garland, An Older, Wiser SBA Makes New Run at Early Stage VC, WALL
ST. J. BLOG (June 11, 2012), http://blogs.wsj.com/venturecapital/2012/06/11/an-older-wiser-
sba-makes-new-run-at-early-stage-vc/; Robb Mandelbaum, SBA Readying Program to Invest
in Startups, N.Y. TIMES BLOG (Jan. 23, 2012), http://boss.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/01/23/s-b-a-
readying-program-to-invest-in-start-ups/ (describing the program as “a debt structure under-
neath an equity fund” and therefore “an inherent mismatch, since interest and debt payments
are predictable while an equity investment is anything but.”).
51. For example, the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) and Small Business
Technology Transfer (STTR) programs require federal agencies with substantial research and
development budgets to award a small percentage of grants to small businesses. Frequently
Asked Questions, SBIR, SMALL BUS. INNOVATION RESEARCH, http://www.sbir.gov/faq/sbir
(last visited Aug. 14, 2012) (discussing the SBIR program); Frequently Asked Questions,
STTR, SMALL BUS. INNOVATION RESEARCH, http://www.sbir.gov/faq/sttr (last visited Aug.
2012) (discussing the STTR program).
52. EISINGER, supra note 7, at 255–60.
53. For example, state-sponsored venture capital is often credited with facilitating the
substantial private VC market in Israel. LERNER, supra note 6, at 155–57.
54. For example, in 2011 VC firms invested a total of $240 million in companies head-
quartered in Oregon.  Only $8.4 million of that amount came from funds located in Oregon.
NAT’L VENTURE CAPITAL ASS’N, NVCA Y.B. 2012 [hereinafter “NVCA YEARBOOK 2012”],
available at http://www.nvca.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=257&
Itemid=103.
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is normally a precursor to venture capital.  The typical angel investor is a
wealthy individual, such as a previously successful entrepreneur, who in-
vests his or her personal funds in local start-ups.55  Like these individuals,
VDFs provide funding below the minimum investment amounts of most
VC funds.  The Portland Seed Fund makes investments as small as $25,000
and the New Orleans Startup Fund makes investments as small as
$50,000.56  Other VDFs make investments ranging from $250,000 to
$750,000.57  VC funds, in contrast, rarely invest less than $5 million in a
single company.58
By providing these smaller investment amounts, VDFs fall squarely in
the so-called “funding gap.” According to many commentators, entrepre-
neurs often fail because there is a dearth of financing options between the
amount of personal funds typically available to an entrepreneur and the
minimum amounts VC funds are willing to invest.59  This implies that
many of these companies could ultimately succeed with relatively small
amounts of seed financing that would tide them over while the business
grew to justify a $5 million or larger VC investment.  Economists disagree
on the extent, causes, and even the existence of this funding gap,60 but it
has been a fixture in policy debates for decades.61  While several sources
of financing have been identified as potentially filling the funding gap, in-
cluding angel investor groups,62 super angels,63 and corporate investors
55. Abraham J.B. Cable, Fending for Themselves: Why Securities Regulations Should
Encourage Angel Groups, 13 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 107, 116 (2010).
56. Our Strategy, PORTLAND SEED FUND, http://portlandseedfund.com/about-us/ (last
visited April 12, 2013); About, NEW ORLEANS STARTUP FUND, http://www.neworleansstartup
fund.com/about/ (last visited  April 12, 2013) (follow “faq” hyperlink).
57. Supra note 29.
58. Participating Securities Hearings, supra note 49, at 54.
59. See generally Cable, supra note 55 (citing commentators identifying a funding gap).
60. Gordon Murray et al., Government Co-Financed ‘Hybrid’ Venture Capital
Programmes: Generalizing Developed Economy Experience and Its Relevance to Emerging
Nations, (Kauffman International Research and Policy Roundtable, Liverpool, March 11-12,
2012) available at http://sites.kauffman.org/irpr/resources/Murray,%20Gordon%20-%20Gov
ernment%20co-financed%20eHybridi%20Venture%20Capital%20programmes.pdf (“Al-
though the evidence in the literature on the existence of financing gaps as well as on the
effect of venture capital on economic growth is still developing, there has been nevertheless a
significant growth across several developed countries in government supported structures
targeted at facilitating risk capital investments to new, high potential enterprises.”).
61. EISINGER, supra note 7, at 248 (discussing the lack of investment by VC funds
below then-current minimum investment amounts of $500,000).
62. Ibrahim, supra note 6, at 721.
63. Pui-Wing Tam & Spencer Ante, Super Angels Alight:  No Longer Flying Solo, Big
Investors Attract Others to Juice Start-Ups, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 16, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/
article/SB10001424052748703321004575427840232755162.html (defining super angels as in-
volved investors who form small funds (generally less than $50 million) to make seed invest-
ments in start-ups).
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looking for strategic benefits,64 none of these alternatives has yet devel-
oped into a reliable bridge to venture capital.
VDFs, then, are closely linked to venture capital, even if the funding
they provide comes at an earlier stage in a company’s life.  Advocates for
VDFs often explicitly state that their goal is to produce companies ready
for venture capital,65 and these advocates often cite the amount of follow-
on investment by VC funds as a measure of the program’s effectiveness.66
C. Why Common Venture Development Rationales Fall Flat
Because VC success stories are widely admired in the United States
and abroad,67 it is easy to gloss over the complexity of the relationship
between private entrepreneurial finance markets and broader economic
development goals. Growing use of the term “venture development” sug-
gests an obvious connection between venture capital (a specialized form of
corporate finance typically carried out through private contracts) and eco-
nomic development goals (efforts to improve economies in ways that pro-
duce broad-based benefits to a particular community).68
But what public purpose justifies using public resources to favor VC
funds and their portfolio companies over other economic actors?  Part II
associates VDFs with broader economic development strategies aimed at
easing the difficulty many subnational regions face in transitioning to a
knowledge-based economy.  Before turning to that more elaborate justifi-
cation of VDFs, however, it is helpful to consider why the more straight-
forward purported virtues of venture capital, frequently extolled by the
industry, likely fall short in justifying subsidization.
64. Joseph A. McCahery & Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Venture Capital Beyond the Finan-
cial Crisis: How Corporate Venturing Boosts New Entrepreneurial Clusters (and Assists Gov-
ernments in Their Innovation Efforts) (Tilburg Univ. Legal Studies, Working Paper No. 011/
2010, 2010).
65. See supra note 29 and accompanying text (discussing the goals of the New Orleans
Startup Fund); see also supra note 3 (discussing the goals of JumpStart).
66. Supra note 3 (discussing JumpStart’s use of follow-on funding as a metric for eval-
uating the fund’s performance); INNOVATION WORKS, http://www.innovationworks.org/
AboutUs/FAQs/tabid/92/Default.aspx (last visited Aug. 14, 2012) (“Nearly three of four ven-
ture deals in the region go to companies that have previously received IW seed funding.
These figures are a reflection not only of the growing maturity of IW’s portfolio, but also the
quality of investments and the increasing ability of IW to connect portfolio companies with
the right investors.”).
67. See Gilson, supra note 17 (discussing efforts to emulate the U.S. VC system in R
Europe, Israel, and South America); Darian M. Ibrahim & D. Gordon Smith, Entrepreneurs
on Horseback: Reflections on the Organization of Law, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 71, 81 (2008)
(describing the “mythological” importance of entrepreneurship).
68. EISINGER, supra note 7, at 3–4 (“Economic development policy refers to those
efforts by government to encourage new business investment in particular locales in the
hopes of directly creating or retaining jobs, setting into motion the secondary employment
multiplier, and enhancing and diversifying the tax base.”).
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Jobs
Job creation is the most common justification for favoring venture cap-
ital and VC-backed companies.69  The VC industry claims that VC-backed
companies account for a disproportionate amount of job growth in the
United States.70  Although it is difficult to measure the precise impact of
venture capital on employment,71 the industry’s list of success stories (Ap-
ple, Microsoft, Google)72 makes it difficult to deny the importance of ven-
ture capital to United States labor markets.
While the employment opportunities generated by start-up companies
may be impressive, they do not really answer the question of whether sub-
sidization or other preferential treatment of venture capital is appropriate.
Although many political-economic systems choose to subsidize or favor
specific firms or industries to gain a competitive advantage in international
trade, such “industrial policy” has been more controversial in the United
States (and the United Kingdom).73
Economists identify a long list of drawbacks to firm- and industry-spe-
cific subsidies.  Public officials may lack adequate expertise or incentives
to select subsidy recipients and administer programs.74  Subsidies may
weaken competitive pressures that would otherwise spur innovations or
other measures that enhance productivity.75  A subsidized firm or industry
may inhibit the emergence of (i.e., “crowd out”) non-subsidized competi-
tors by giving subsidy recipients an advantage in competition for custom-
ers or resources.76  Instead of increasing productivity, potential subsidy
69. Id. at 241–43, 245.
70. Cable, supra note 55, at 107.
71. Michael Horrell & Robert Litan, After Inception: How Enduring Is Job Creation
by Startups? (2010), http://www.kauffman.org/uploadedfiles/firm-formation-inception-8-2-10.
pdf (discussing the extent to which jobs created by start-up companies are lost upon company
failures).
72. NVCA YEARBOOK 2012, supra note 54 at 2.
73. See, e.g., Michael Boskin, Industrial Policy Returns From the Grave, PROJECT SYN-
DICATE, (Nov. 24, 2009), http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/industrial-policy-re
turns-from-the-grave (“One of the worst responses by officials to the financial crisis and deep
recession has been to revive ‘industrial policy.’  Once again, governments are using subsidies,
mandates, regulation, and capital investment to pick industrial winners and losers, rather
than using a broad, even-handed approach.  The new round of industrial policy is occurring in
advanced economies such as the United States and the United Kingdom, which long resisted
its worst excesses, France, which long promoted national ‘champions’, and emerging econo-
mies such as Brazil and China.”).
74. Leviathan, Inc.: Governments Seem to Have Forgotten That Picking Industrial Win-
ners Nearly Always Fails, ECONOMIST, Aug. 5, 2010.
75. Michael E. Porter, Clusters and Economic Policy: Aligning Public Policy with the
New Economics of Competition, HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL, at 6 [hereinafter, Porter on
Aligning Public Policy] (discussing anti-competitive effects of industrial policy).
76. Boskin, supra note 73 (“Governments should not be in the game of using subsidies,
taxes, regulation, mandates, loans, and investments to pick particular winners. It simply
doesn’t work, and, worse still, it crowds out or stifles potentially valuable competing technol-
ogies.”); Brazil’s Development Bank, Nest Egg or Serpent’s Egg?  Ahead of Presidential Elec-
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recipients may turn their efforts towards influencing politicians to preserve
or expand the subsidy program.77  In light of these indirect costs of firm-
and industry-specific subsidy programs, U.S. economists and policy mak-
ers generally reserve public subsidies for goods and services that markets
produce at inadequate levels due to an identifiable market failure.78  In
this light, the outsized success of VC-backed companies may in fact be an
argument against assistance through venture development policies, be-
cause it suggests a well-functioning (not a failed) market.
Innovative Products
The innovative products many VC-backed companies develop might
present a stronger economic justification for subsidizing venture capital.
The start-up companies that VC firms target form a special breed of small
business.  They are distinguished from livelihood businesses that primarily
generate income for individuals working in the business, such as local res-
taurants, small construction firms, and professional services firms.79 VC
firms target start-up companies that strive to achieve big returns for inves-
tors by being the first to exploit a sizable market for new products or busi-
ness plans.80  While start-up companies are not the only places innovation
occurs—large technology, bioscience, and manufacturing companies con-
duct significant research and development—there is a growing body of
theory and empirical research suggesting that start-up companies have su-
perior capacity to innovate.81
tions, BNDES Comes Under Scrutiny, ECONOMIST, Aug. 5, 2010 (claiming that a subsidized
development bank in Brazil is crowding out other private financing sources).
77. See LERNER, supra note 6, at 80-85 (discussing capture of state-sponsored VC
funds).
78. See BRETT M. FRISCHMANN, INFRASTRUCTURE:  THE SOCIAL VALUE OF SHARED
RESOURCES 77 (2012) (describing the conventional case for subsidy of public goods); Wallace
E. Oates, Towards a Second-Generation Theory of Fiscal Federalism, 12 INT’L TAX AND PUB.
FIN. 349, 350 (2005) (“What I will call the ‘mainline’ theory of fiscal federalism was solidly
embedded in the view of public finance that prevailed in the 1950’s and 1960’s. . . . Where the
private market system ‘failed’ because of various sorts of public-goods problems, the govern-
ment should (and presumably would) step in and introduce appropriate policy measures to
correct the failures.”); Tyler Cowen, Public Goods and Externalities, THE CONCISE ENCYCLO-
PEDIA OF ECON., http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc1/PublicGoodsandExternalities.html
(“Most economic arguments for government intervention are based on the idea that the mar-
ketplace cannot provide public goods or handle externalities. Public health and welfare pro-
grams, education, roads, research and development, national and domestic security, and a
clean environment all have been labeled public goods.”) (last visited Feb. 2, 2013).
79. Cable, supra note 55, at 111–112.
80. Venture capital is often associated with technological advances such as
semi–conductors.  But in some cases, a high-growth start-up is innovative because it delivers
products in a new way or identifies  (or creates) previously unrecognized consumer demand.
Examples of non-technical start-ups include Starbucks Corporation, eBay Inc., and Whole
Foods Market, Inc., NVCA YEARBOOK 2012, supra note 54, at 7–8.
81. LERNER, supra note 6, at 45–63.
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There are reasons to think markets undersupply innovative products.
One problem is that new technologies are non-rival in use.  Once a prod-
uct is developed, subsequent use has negligible cost so there is great incen-
tive for competitors to use technology that others have gone to the
expense to develop. An innovator could try to prevent others from making
unauthorized use of the product, but it is often challenging or costly to
exclude others from the innovations underlying products (to the extent
that intellectual property rights do not provide adequate protection).82
One challenge is that the use of the product often necessitates disclosure
of the innovation. When private parties cannot capture the benefits of
these positive “spillover effects” or “externalities,” they produce fewer
new technologies than would be optimal from society’s point of view.83
This is the type of market failure that may justify a subsidy under main-
stream economic theory.84
Even this more plausible economic argument falls flat when consider-
ing venture development efforts by subnational governments.  While there
may be a case for indirectly subsidizing start-up companies that develop
new medical devices broadly benefiting society, for example, it is less clear
that it is in a particular city’s best interest to bear that cost.  The device
may provide national (even international) benefits.  Ideally, the costs of
goods or services that produce positive spillover effects should be borne
82. For example, intellectual property law may not provide adequate incentives for
innovation because obtaining and enforcing intellectual property rights takes too long or is
expensive.  Moreover, encouraging innovation through intellectual property rights requires
extremely delicate balancing of maintaining competition and providing incentives to inno-
vate.  Overly broad rights granted other entrepreneurs might actually discourage innovation.
See Nat’l Research Council, A Patent System for the 21st Century 46-51, 65–70, 104 (Stephen
A. Merrill, et al. eds. 2004) (discussing costs of obtaining and enforcing patents, backlogs in
the patent-approval process, and degradations in the quality of patents).  Finally, intellectual
property protections may not correct certain market failures because the relevant externali-
ties are social goods that do not generate appropriable value in a consumer market.
FRISCHMANN, supra note 78, at 109-110.
83. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, FUNDING A REVOLUTION: GOV’T SUPPORT FOR COM-
PUTING RESEARCH 40-51 (1999), available at http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=
6323&page=R2.  In economic terms, a product or service that is truly non-rival and non-
excludable is a “public good.”  These attributes may exist in varying degrees, and there are
debates about how non-rival and non-excludable a good or service needs to be to meet the
technical definition. See David Mangum, UNIV. OF COLO. LAW SCH., Bringing Angel Inves-
tors Out of The Shadows (2012), available at http://www.silicon-flatirons.org/documents/pub
lications/report/AngelReport2012.pdf (expressing doubt that angel investing meets the tech-
nical definition of a public good).  For this article’s analysis, though, what matters most is not
whether a technology is a pure public good or not, but rather whether it creates positive
externalities and is therefore undersupplied by the market and arguably a basis for subsidiza-
tion. NOLAN H. MILLER, NOTES ON MICROECONOMIC THEORY 212 (Aug. 2006 ed.), availa-
ble at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/nhm/notes2006/notes8.pdf (“Examples of externalities and
public goods tend to overlap.  It is hard to say what is an externality and what is a public
good.  This is as you would expect, since the two categories are really just different ways of
talking about goods with non-private aspects.”).
84. Cowen, supra note 78.
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by jurisdictions covering the entire geographic area that benefits from the
spillovers.85
II. VENTURE DEVELOPMENT IN CONTEXT:
AGGLOMERATION ECONOMIES
Evaluating the effectiveness of VDFs requires understanding their
goals.  Part I explained that subnational governments do not invest in
VDFs for financial returns,86 that the jobs created by VC-backed compa-
nies may indicate a well-functioning market rather than a need for sub-
sidy,87 and that the benefits associated with innovative products likely
spillover too broadly to be captured by a subnational government.88  This
part considers how VDFs instead function as part of a broader trend in
economic development: seeking to support market-driven agglomeration
economies (“agglomeration development”).
A. The Development Challenge: Economic Transformation
and Regional Sorting
VDFs are located in places undergoing or desiring economic transfor-
mation.89  The desired transformation typically relates to the growing im-
portance of the “knowledge-based” economy relative to more traditional
industries, particularly those emphasizing natural resource extraction and
manufacturing.
The transition to a knowledge-based economy is a “shift from an econ-
omy based on production of commodities to one dominated by the design,
marketing, and delivery of goods, services, and ideas . . . .”90  In a tradi-
tional manufacturing economy, firms compete largely by reducing the
costs of factors of production such as labor, transportation, and capital. In
a knowledge-based economy, firms compete more on the basis of innova-
85. This concept, for example, has been applied to argue that redistributive policies be
carried out at the federal level.  When carried out by local jurisdictions, such policies may
generate externalities (such as outmigration of high tax payers to other jurisdictions).  Oates,
supra note 78, at 351 (discussing concepts of fiscal federalism).  Of course, “perfect mapping”
of costs and benefits is not always possible with technologies that provide global benefits.
However, subsidization at the federal, rather than state or local, level would still be closer to
the ideal.
86. See supra Part I.A.
87. See supra text accompanying notes 69–72.
88. See supra text accompanying notes 80–85.
89. The oldest and best-established VDFs are found Cleveland and Pittsburgh—Rust
Belt cities desiring greater participation in the knowledge-based economy. See supra notes 3,
27 (discussing Jumpstart in Cleveland); supra note 30 (discussing Innovation Works in Pitts-
burgh).  A more surprising VDF location is New York City.  Despite the city’s success as a
financial center, an economic development authority established the NYC Entrepreneurial
Fund to diversify the economy away from financial services and to improve the city’s profile
as a destination for technology companies. See De Avila, supra note 29.
90. RICHARD M. MCGAHEY & JENNIFER S. VEY, RETOOLING FOR GROWTH:  BUILD-
ING A 21ST CENTURY ECONOMY IN AMERICA’S OLDER INDUSTRIAL AREAS 43 (2008).
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tion by producing disruptive new technologies or identifying new markets
for products.91  Many individual businesses have characteristics of both
traditional and knowledge-based economic activity (e.g., car manufactur-
ers dedicate significant resources to developing technologies),92 but the
overall shift towards a knowledge-based economy in the United States is
widely perceived and evidenced by significant increases since 1950 in re-
search and development spending, patents, and the number of scientists
and engineers.93
The transition towards a knowledge-based U.S. economy resulted from
global economic trends such as reduced transportation costs and techno-
logical advancement that facilitates outsourcing manufacturing to cheaper
locations.94  But its effects feel local, varying greatly from location to loca-
tion. According to economist Edward Glaeser: “The age of the industrial
city is over, at least in the West, and it will never return.  Some erstwhile
manufacturing towns have managed to evolve from making goods to mak-
ing ideas, but most continue their slow, inexorable declines.”95  Statistical
evidence supports the well-established perception of Rust Belt decline.  A
high percentage of employment in manufacturing is correlated with poor
economic performance (measured by employment, earnings, and gross
metropolitan product) in the 1990s.96 According to one study, a majority
of “economically distressed” cities are located in eight states in the Mid-
west and Northeast: Connecticut, Indiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, New
Jersey, New York, Ohio, and Pennsylvania.97  In contrast, high-tech hubs
like Silicon Valley enjoy healthy economic growth.98
B. Theoretical Foundations: Agglomeration Effects
Agglomeration economies explain why economic activity—and the
knowledge-based economy in particular—continues to concentrate geo-
graphically despite lowering transportation costs and improved communi-
91. In a knowledge-based economy: “The basic economic resources—the ‘means of
production,’ to use the economist’s term is no longer capital, nor natural resources . . . nor
‘labor.’  It is and will be knowledge.” FLORIDA, supra note 21, at 44.  The idea (or “knowl-
edge”) may relate to either high technology or new business models. NVCA YEARBOOK
2012, supra note 54, 7–8.
92. For example, General Motors dedicates significant resources to research and de-
velopment. See General Motors Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 84 (Feb. 14, 2013) (dis-
closing that the company spent $7.368 billion on research and development).
93. FLORIDA, supra note 21, at 44–47.
94. See MCGAHEY, supra note 90, at 35–36.
95. EDWARD GLAESER, TRIUMPH OF THE CITY 49 (2011).
96. See MCGAHEY, supra note 90, at 159–160.
97. Id. at 153.
98. FLORIDA, supra note 21, at 219 (“Not only do people remain highly concentrated,
but the economy itself—the high-tech, knowledge-based, and creative-content industries that
drive so much of economic growth—continues to concentrate in specific places from Austin
and Silicon Valley to New York City and Hollywood, just as the automotive industry once
concentrated in Detroit.”).
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cations technologies, both of which would seem to undercut the traditional
economic rationales for the formation of cities.99  According to this
emerging perspective, firms and entrepreneurs benefit from geographic
proximity to competitors, related firms, and other entrepreneurs.100  Geo-
graphic concentration of economic activity results in increased firm pro-
ductivity and increased innovation.101  In other words, Google would not
be as productive if it were headquartered in Cleveland, and other compa-
nies in Silicon Valley (even Google’s competitors) would be less produc-
tive without Google being located right down the street.  While
agglomeration effects are viewed as extremely influential, they are also
very localized, dissipating quickly over geographic space.102  Thus, while
high-profile technology companies in Silicon Valley certainly have interna-
tional reach, agglomeration theory looks to very localized positive spil-
lover effects to explain their successes.
The proposition that spatial proximity of economic activity increases
productivity is not new or particularly controversial.  Economists observed
agglomeration effects as early as the nineteenth century.103  Over fifty
years ago, Jane Jacobs included an influential description of agglomeration
effects in her seminal work: The Death and Life of a Great American
City.104
There are several different explanations, however, for how agglomera-
tion efficiencies are generated.  These explanations can range from com-
plex models (including Paul Krugman’s Nobel-Prize-winning work)105 to
entertaining best-selling books.106  Summarized below are three accounts
of agglomeration effects that have gained traction with politicians, eco-
nomic development professionals, and nontechnical audiences.
Human Capital Explanation
One explanation of agglomeration focuses on human capital—the tal-
ented workers who concentrate in business clusters.  The “thick” labor
99. Id. at 219–22 (explaining why “end of geography” predictions have proven false);
David Schleicher, The City as a Law and Economic Subject, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1507,
1515–29 (2010) (“If we postulate only the usual list of economic forces, cities should fall
apart. . . . A city is simply a collection of factors of production—capital, people and land—
and land is almost always far cheaper outside cities than inside.”) (quoting Robert E. Lucas,
Jr.).
100. See articles cited supra note 21.
101. See infra text accompanying notes 109, 116, and 121 (discussing empirical studies
of the effects of agglomeration).
102. Schleicher, supra note 99 (citing studies that show patent applications rely on prior
works originating in close geographic proximity).
103. Id. at 1516 (discussing Alfred Marshall).
104. GLAESER, supra note 9, at 20.
105. Justin Lahart, Paul Krugman Is Awarded Nobel in Economics, WALL ST. J., (Oct.
14, 2008), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122389602110728309.html
106. For example, Richard Florida’s The Rise of the Creative Class and his Who’s Your
City were national bestsellers.
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markets that characterize agglomeration economies facilitate agglomera-
tion effects in a number of ways.  Firms concentrate to gain access to pools
of talented workers.  This creates a virtuous cycle because the abundance
of potential employers attracts workers (and thereby increases the size of
the labor pool) by reducing risk of sustained unemployment and providing
opportunities for increased productivity through specialization.107 Work-
ers also facilitate the sharing of new knowledge among employers.  As
workers change jobs or have other encounters in the community, they may
spread best practices or introduce new skills or knowledge.  In other
words, they become a vehicle for spreading information spillovers.108
Glaeser, a primary proponent of the human capital view, found empirical
support for the proposition that workers in fact become more productive
(increase their human capital) by moving to denser urban areas.109
Creative Capital Explanation
Sociologist Richard Florida has put a new spin on the human capital
explanation.  He explains agglomeration effects by focusing on a particular
segment of society—the “creative class.”  This class includes a “super-cre-
ative core” of workers in high-tech, artistic, and entertainment occupa-
tions together with supporting “creative professionals.”110  Florida
believes that members of the creative class are responsible for a dispropor-
tionate share of innovation and regional economic growth and that the
creative class concentrates in areas with certain cultural attributes.111
Florida supports his theory with statistical analyses.112  He found that
the creative class clustered significantly in regions with certain attrib-
utes.113  For example, Florida found that policies evidencing tolerance of
diversity were correlated with a high concentration of technology work-
ers.114  Florida produced indexes that measure hallmarks of the creative
class and found that these indexes were highly correlated with regional
107. GLAESER, supra note 95, at 32 (claiming that concentration of economic activity in
cities “create[s] a virtuous cycle in which employers are attracted by the large pool of poten-
tial employees and workers are drawn by the abundance of potential employers”).
108. Schleicher, supra note 99, at 1527.
109. Id. at 1527-28.  Glaeser found that higher wages in urban areas appear to reflect
increased productivity.  When workers move to an urban area, they enjoy increased real
wages, but on a delayed basis (consistent with the idea that they acquire the human capital in
the new location).  When they leave the urban area, their wages remain elevated (suggesting
they have retained the increased productivity).
110. FLORIDA, supra note 21, at 328.
111. Id. at 223 (“Essentially, my theory says that regional economic growth is driven by
the location choices of creative people—the holders of creative capital—who prefer places
that are diverse, tolerant, and open to new ideas.”).
112. Id. at 250–66.
113. Id. at 235–48.
114. Florida ranks cities according to a “Gay Index,” which his research shows to be
highly correlated with high-tech activity. Id. at 255–58.
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population and employment growth.115  Finally, Florida cites studies by a
third party who found his creative class theory to be more predictive of
regional economic growth than competing theories.116
Critics dispute that Florida has convincingly established a causal rela-
tionship between cultural amenities and economic growth.117  But his
work is influential in economic development circles.118
Cluster Explanation
Michael Porter of Harvard Business School is particularly active in the
economic development community.119  Porter explains agglomeration ef-
fects by analyzing interactions between and among firms within clusters of
economic activity.  Porter defines clusters as “geographic concentrations of
interconnected companies, specialized suppliers, service providers, firms in
related industries, and associated institutions (e.g., universities, standards
agencies, trade associations) in a particular field that compete but also co-
operate.”120  Where clusters have been identified, they are correlated with
employment growth, increasing wages, and innovation as measured by
patents.121
Clusters are broader than most traditional industry classifications be-
cause they include multiple linked industries.  For example, Porter identi-
fies a “fishing and fishing products” cluster in Alaska that includes types of
businesses that would, under most classification systems, be considered
three separate industries:  fish products, fishing and hunting, and
processed seafood.  As this example illustrates, the cluster concept does
not only exist in the knowledge-based economy.  Clusters can relate to
traditional manufacturing or natural resource extraction. Moreover, clus-
115. Id. at 263.
116. FLORIDA, supra note 21, at 273 (citing studies by Robert Cushing correlating a
region’s population growth and indicators of a region’s human capital, social capital, and
creative capital).
117. Adam Ozimek, Richard Florida Is Wrong About Creative Cities, FORBES.COM
(May 23, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/modeledbehavior/2012/05/23/richard-florida-is-
wrong-about-creative-cities/ (discussing Enrico Meoretti’s assertion that Florida “essentially
gets the causation backwards”).
118. MCGAHEY, supra note 90, at 7.
119. Clusters:  Sexy but Mysterious and Elusive, 8 JOURNAL OF APPLIED RESEARCH IN
ECON. DEV. 1, 1 (2011) [hereinafter JARED] (“It is my perception that cluster-based eco-
nomic development is one of the very hottest, sexy concepts found in current local economic
development. It certainly has been embraced by well-connected research institutes and think
tanks and even a cursory review of academic research reveals literally a hundred different
articles, books and studies on some facet of clustering.”).
120. Porter on Economic Development, supra note 20, at 15.
121. MERCEDES DELGADO ET AL., CLUSTERS, CONVERGENCE, AND ECONOMIC PER-
FORMANCE 1, 1 (2011) (“Industries participating in a strong cluster register higher employ-
ment growth as well as higher growth of wages, number of establishments, and patenting”).
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ters may be local (catering to local residents) or “traded” (catering to mar-
kets outside the cluster’s geographic base).122
Porter believes that clusters give participants a competitive advantage
by, among other things, driving innovation and stimulating entrepreneurial
activity related to the cluster.123  While Porter acknowledges the role of
human capital in producing agglomeration effects within clusters,124 he
also emphasizes other “linkages” between firms.  For example, he believes
that related industries benefit from knowledge spillovers when they inter-
act with specialized suppliers within the cluster and try to meet the de-
mands of sophisticated customers within the cluster.125  Participants in
clusters also benefit from information spillovers through encounters at lo-
cal supporting institutions (e.g., educational institutions and trade associa-
tions).126  Finally, strong local competition for the cluster’s customers and
other resources motivates cluster participants to increase productivity,
even while simultaneously cooperating with local competitors in establish-
ing supporting institutions.127
While it is possible for some of the activities credited with producing
agglomeration effects to occur through remote communication, it appears
that geographic proximity is key to agglomeration.  With respect to infor-
mation spillovers, for example, studies indicate that patent applications
disproportionately cite prior works originating near the location of the
patent applicant.128  One theory for why location matters is that remote
communication functions more effectively when it supplements, rather
than replaces, face-to-face relationships.129
122. Porter has made substantial efforts to identify or “map” clusters.  Porter identifies
clusters by looking for industries that tend to have high concentrations of employment in the
same geographic regions, leading to an inference of linkages between industries. See Cluster
Mapping - A Primer,” U.S. CLUSTER MAPPING PROJECT, http://www.clustermapping.us/help-
overview/cluster-mapping—-a-primer/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2013).  Porter also considers link-
ages evidenced by input-output tables compiled by the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Michael E. Porter 37 REGIONAL STUD. 504, 563 (2003), available at http://www.camaramed.
org.co:81/mcc/sites/default/files/doc_digital/anexos/2010/Sep/Economic_Performance_%20
Regions_PORTER.pdf. Detailed information about the results and methodology of Porter’s
efforts to identify or “map” clusters can be found on the website www.clustermapping.us,
which is maintained by the U.S. Economic Development Agency (“USDA”).
123. Porter on New Economics, supra note 21, at 78, 84.
124. Porter on Aligning Public Policy, supra note 75, at 2.
125. MCGAHEY, supra note 90, at 7.
126. Porter on Aligning Public Policy, supra note 75, at 2.
127. See DELGADO, ET AL., supra note 121, at 9 (“A strong cluster will enable greater
agglomeration economies, including larger pools of skilled employees, specialized suppliers,
related industries, sophisticated buyers, and intense local competition”) (emphasis added).
128. See Schleicher, supra note 102.
129. GLAESER, supra note 95, at 43 (citing studies regarding the effectiveness of remote
communication).
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C. Agglomeration Theory in Practice: Agglomeration Development
Agglomeration theory is contributing to significant changes in eco-
nomic development practices.  While some of these changes were under-
way prior to the literatures on human capital, creative capital, and clusters
described above, the popularity and accessibility of those literatures accel-
erated change in economic development practices.  In one recent survey,
for example, over half of responding economic development organizations
had studied or engaged in cluster development.130  This Part II.C describes
the growing dissatisfaction with traditional economic development prac-
tices, the emergence of new practices embracing agglomeration, and the
role of VDFs in this changing landscape.
Out with the Old: The Problem with Smokestack Chasing
and Industrial Policy
Long before the rise of state-sponsored venture capital, subnational
governments tried to attract or retain businesses by offering a wide variety
of financial incentives.  These traditional location incentives, which con-
tinue today, are geared toward reducing a firm’s costs of production—a
primary basis for competition in a traditional manufacturing or natural re-
source economy.  These programs offer public bond financing, tax credits,
favorable loans, and a wide variety of other incentives for firms to build
local facilities and create local jobs.131  They can be tailored to a specific
firm known to be contemplating relocation or to firms within a particular
industry that economic development officials have identified as attractive.
The amount subnational governments spend on these expenditures is sub-
stantial, though not easily determined—one commentator estimated that
these incentives totaled at least $50 billion in 1996.132
Traditional location subsidies have lost favor in economic development
circles and, to some extent, in public opinion.  Efforts to recruit specific
firms are referred to pejoratively as “smokestack chasing,” and efforts
targeted at narrow industries are disfavored as industrial policy.133
There is a vast literature criticizing interlocal competition for economic
activity.  These criticisms employ various race-to-the-bottom argu-
130. See MCGAHEY, supra note 90, at 10, 18 (discussing development efforts based on
the works of Porter and Florida).
131. Michael H. LaFave, Taking Back the Giveaways:  Minnesota’s Corporate Welfare
Legislation and the Search of Accountability, 80 MINN. L. REV. 1579, 1584 (1996).
132. MCGAHEY, supra note 90, at 5.
133. See id. (discussing the term “smokestack chasing”); Porter on Aligning Public Pol-
icy, supra note 72, at 1 (“Industrial policy, which focuses on supporting individual industries,
is distortive and interventionist. Picking winners, and attempting to nurture them through
subsidies and protection, rarely succeeds.”).  There is still significant academic debate, how-
ever, regarding whether tax competition is harmful or beneficial. See generally  John Douglas
Wilson & David E. Wildasin, Capital Tax Competition: Bane or Boon?, JOURNAL OF PUBLIC
ECONOMICS 88 (2004) 1065-1091 (reviewing “both the good and the bad aspects of tax
competition”).
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ments.134  Some commentators focus on the interjurisdictional effects of
local competition.  These commentators suggest that subsidies, while po-
tentially providing net benefits for the subsidizing jurisdiction, result in
inefficient aggregate local taxation across all jurisdictions.135  By this ac-
count, there is an optimal level of tax burden—required to provide an
appropriate level of public services—that, in the absence of collective ac-
tion problems among local governments, businesses would be asked to
bear.  Because of collective action problems, however, individual jurisdic-
tions may offer tax breaks or subsidies that, while producing a net gain to
the subsidizing jurisdiction, result in suboptimal taxation in the aggre-
gate.136  The resulting policy prescription is to limit the ability of subna-
tional governments to offer location incentives through some type of
federal intervention.137  Other commentators focus on intrajurisdictional
effects, suggesting that subsidies produce no net benefit for the subsidizing
jurisdiction.138  Competition for business is thought to create pressure on
subnational governments that exacerbate typical hazards of subsidy pro-
grams, such incompetent administration or susceptibility to interest group
pressure.139 Following high-profile examples of seemingly overwhelmed
local officials badly miscalculating costs and benefits of generous subsidies,
voters in several states enacted laws that claw back benefits if expected
jobs do not materialize.140
For the most part, the existing literature on location incentives and in-
terlocal competition does not focus on agglomeration effects.141  One can
imagine how the existence of agglomeration effects might actually validate
location incentives.  If clusters of related industries increase productivity,
134. See Peter D. Enrich, Saving the States from Themselves:  Commerce Clause Con-
straints on State Tax Incentives for Business, 110 HARV. L. REV. 377, 397–405 (1996); Clayton
P. Gillette, Symposium:  The Law and Economics of Federalism: Business Incentives, Inter-
state Competition, and the Commerce Clause, 82 MINN. L. REV. 447, 451 (1997); Richard C.
Schragger, Mobile Capital, Local Economic Regulation, and the Democratic City, 123 HARV.
L. REV. 482, 491-98 (2009).





140. LaFave, supra note 131, at 1595 (discussing a Minnesota statute).
141. Clayton Gillette and David Schelicher come closest.  Schleicher discusses agglom-
eration effects extensively in a recent article, but his primary focus is not business incentives
but rather how policies resulting in sprawl and metropolitan fragmentation (such as the scope
of local zoning powers) may impede agglomeration effects by reducing urban density. See
discussion infra Part III.C.1. .  Gillette references the agglomeration literature in postulating
that local redistributive policies might be tolerated by mobile citizens because they increase
local diversity and the potential for beneficial knowledge spillovers.  Clayton Gillette, Local
Redistribution, Living Wage Ordinances, and Judicial Intervention, 101 NW. U.L. REV. 1057,
1077–80 (2007). Gillette has also suggested, without directly referencing the agglomeration
literature, that business incentives may reveal nonobvious location advantages.  See discus-
sion infra Park IV.C.1.
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then perhaps subnational governments could have a role in engineering
agglomeration economies by recruiting firms to construct clusters.  For ex-
ample, the city of Austin’s rise as an entrepreneurial center coincided with
successful recruitment of related companies through traditional
incentives.142
In fact, proponents of agglomeration development take a very dim
view of industrial policy and smokestack chasing.  Even if one focuses only
on potential effects on the sponsoring jurisdiction (putting aside the in-
terjurisdictional effects on other locations),143 a number of potential ob-
jections to industrial policy and smokestack chasing have been identified.
The knowledge-based companies that drive agglomeration effects may
simply not respond to traditional subsidies because companies increasingly
compete on the basis of innovation rather than cost.  Florida argues that
traditional subsidies focused on reducing production costs (through build-
ing new roads, for example) or tax burdens (through tax breaks) are losing
effectiveness because “these cost-related factors are no longer the key to
success.”144
More importantly, proponents of agglomeration development may
worry that subsidies will successfully attract businesses, but in ways that
undermine agglomeration effects.  Because agglomeration economies de-
velop in seemingly idiosyncratic ways that are hard to reproduce, it may
simply be beyond the capacity of government to accurately predict the
direction of agglomeration market forces.145  Porter poses a rhetorical
question highlighting the risk of trying to engineer a cluster:
Clusters emerge spontaneously based on market forces, and the process of
cluster formation will occur naturally as new firms form, suppliers develop,
infrastructure investments respond to local needs, specialized institutions
grow, and established firms elsewhere locate operations in growing cluster
142. FLORIDA, supra note 21, at 298–300.
143. For a discussion of interjurisdictional considerations, see supra text accompanying
notes 286–89.
144. FLORIDA, supra note 21, at 221.
145. According to a Kauffman Foundation report prepared by Edward Glaeser and
other commentators:
In retrospect, the launch of the semiconductor industry first by Fairchild and later re-
fined by Intel that jump-started Silicon Valley essentially was accidental. Even Stanford
University’s celebrated role has been questioned, although both Stanford and its Bay
Area rival, the University of California at Berkeley, since have hosted many faculty and
students who have gone on to create new enterprises. (Indeed, the reverse may be the
key point: Both Bay Area universities have benefited from the emergence and growth of
many high-tech firms in the region). California’s good weather also probably played a
role in attracting some of the original talent who made the Valley into what it later
became. But good weather is not always required. The auto industry’s development in
and around Detroit in the early decades of the last century also was serendipitous.
Zoltan J. Acs et al., Entrepreneurship and Urban Success: Toward a Policy Consensus, 3
(2008) (citations omitted), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=10
92493.
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concentrations. Given such spontaneous economic processes responding to
market signals, should clusters just be left alone to develop naturally?146
Backing the wrong company for cluster participation can have several
negative consequences.  First, it may result in failure of the subsidized or
favored company.  If agglomeration effects are in fact decisive in a com-
pany’s success, and if expected linkages between companies fail to materi-
alize, the subsidy recipient may underperform competitors in locations
with a better agglomerative fit.
Favoring a particular firm or industry may also adversely affect other
firms in the jurisdiction by making it difficult for them to compete for
labor, private investment, and other resources due to the advantages en-
joyed by the subsidy recipients.147  This crowding out of potential competi-
tors might reduce the pace of innovation within the cluster.  Porter, in
particular, believes that competition among cluster participants (combined
with simultaneous cooperation through trade associations or other support
institutions) is a key driver of productivity-enhancing innovations.148  In
addition, the eliminated competitors might have been a better fit for the
cluster than the subsidized firm due to stronger linkages with cluster par-
ticipants.  Finally, the eliminated competitors could have added to the eco-
nomic diversity of the region, and such diversity is thought to increase
potential spillovers and aid agglomeration effects.149
Accordingly, proponents of agglomeration development distance their
policy prescriptions from conventional subsidies.  Florida, for example,
emphasizes the breadth of his proposals to distinguish them from narrowly
targeted subsidies.  In discussing the role of subnational governments, he
advocates for “investing in our stock of creativity in all of its forms, across
the board,” including the arts and other cultural institutions.150  In ex-
plaining the emergence of Austin as a high-tech center, for example, he
goes to great lengths to argue that the city’s successful recruitment of spe-
cific firms through traditional location incentives was not the driving
force.151
Porter also distances himself from smokestack chasing or narrowly-fo-
cused industrial policy.  He explains:
Cluster-based policies, unlike sectoral or industrial policies, should be neutral
with regard to industry or type of economic activity. In cluster theory, all clus-
146. Porter on Aligning Public Policy, supra note 75, at 6.
147. C.f. supra note 76 (discussing the possibility that subsidies crowd out competing
firms).  Crowding out is mitigated if the non-subsidized company can rely on labor, capital, or
other resources from different jurisdictions.  But companies may find it difficult, for example,
to raise capital from non-local sources. See infra notes 167–70.
148. DELGADO ET AL., supra note 127.
149. Gillette, supra note 141, at 1077–80.
150. FLORIDA, supra note 21, at 260.
151. Id. at 298–300 (emphasizing instead research activities at the University of Texas
and investments in music venues and other lifestyle amenities Florida associates with creative
workers).
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ters are good. Enhancing cluster externalities and spillovers will increase pro-
ductivity and prosperity in any cluster. Hence government should not choose
among clusters but create policies that support upgrading in every cluster pre-
sent in a location. Cluster policy is thus fundamentally different from sectoral
or industrial policy, whose fatal flaw is their focus on favoring particular types
of economic activity, picking winners, and attempting to artificially bias com-
petition in favor of a particular country or region.152
In with the New:  Agglomeration Development
Although conventional location subsidies persist,153 a new paradigm of
economic development has emerged.  This new paradigm is sometimes re-
ferred to as “demand-side” economic development.154  The goal of these
new strategies is not to buy jobs by absorbing some of the cost of produc-
tion.  Instead, the goal is to promote and upgrade features of a local eco-
nomic environment that are conducive to the knowledge-based economy
(thereby creating demand for local investment).155 The trend has been un-
derway for decades, and its most prominent form focuses on identifying
and cultivating nascent agglomeration economies.156
Proponents of agglomeration development identify the following func-
tions as appropriate for government in encouraging agglomeration effects:
• Collecting information about industry clusters;157
• Convening potential participants in clusters for planning exercises
and ongoing trade associations;158
• Workforce training and education;159
• Pursuing policies and providing amenities that the creative class will
find desirable;160
• Counteracting regulatory hurdles; 161 and
• Curing local market failures by providing public goods with broad
spillover effects.162
152. Porter on Aligning Policy, supra note 75, at 6.
153. See MCGAHEY, supra note 90, at 5.
154. EISINGER, supra note 7, at 230–40 (describing demand-side economic development
efforts).
155. Id.
156. Supra text accompanying note 141.
157. Porter on Aligning Policy, supra note 75, at 5.
158. Id.
159. See MCGAHEY, supra note 90, at 14-19.
160. FLORIDA, supra note 21, at 249-66, 283-314.  Examples of such policies include
downtown revitalization projects, id. at 289, anti-sprawl initiatives, id. at 290, investments in
universities, id. at 292, creating bike lanes and other transportation infrastructure, id. at 294,
and support for nightlife and cultural activities that interest a diverse population, id. at 296.
161. Porter on Economic Development, supra note 21, at 26, 28.
162. Porter on Aligning Policy, supra note 75, at 6, 16, 27.  While Porter uses the term
“public goods,” he appears most focused on broad-based externalities rather than the techni-
cal definition of a public good. See supra text accompanying note 82 (discussing the defini-
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In theory, these functions accelerate or reveal underlying features of a
local economy that are already showing potential for agglomeration ef-
fects.  Instead of trying to create agglomeration economies from scratch,
these policies try to speed their formation.  As will be discussed in Part III
below, however, the distinction proves easier to maintain in theory than
practice.
D. The Proponents’ Likely Case for VDFs: Spillover Effects
of Financial Technology
Before Part III critiques VDFs and other forms of venture develop-
ment, it is first helpful to acknowledge the theoretical case for including
VDFs in agglomeration development efforts.163  The apparent justification
for VDFs is that they establish financial “technology” or “infrastructure”
that may assist in cluster formation beyond the direct recipients of VDF
funding.164  In other words, financing methods have attributes of a public
good with positive spillover effects165 and therefore may be appropriate
tion of a public good).  For example, he suggests governments can provide communication
and transportations systems, which may generate network externalities but are more likely
excludable  “club goods” than true public goods. See Porter on Economic Development,
supra note 21 (providing examples of governmental roles); John A. Weinberg, Network Ex-
ternalities and Public Goods in Payment Systems, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF RICHMOND
(Nov. 1996), available at http://www.minneapolisfed.org/research/events/1996_12-03/Wein
berg_PaymentSystems.pdf.  Porter explains: “Since clusters involve powerful externalities
across firms in a location, and associated public goods, there is a strong rationale for public
policy.  In the presence of positive externalities, market failure will lead to underinvestment
in specialized skills, scientific knowledge, and specialized infrastructure that benefits the en-
tire cluster while also increasing competition through lowering the barriers to entry of new
firms. Public policy that provides rules, mechanisms, and incentives for capturing external
economies will improve productivity and, with it, job, wage, and innovation growth.” Porter
on Aligning Policy, supra note 75, at 5.
163. JARED, supra note 119, at 4 (listing as a component of a cluster-based initiative:
“venture capital and startup/small business counseling/financing for new company forma-
tion”). See also MICHAEL E. PORTER, CLUSTERS OF INNOVATION INITIATIVE: PITTSBURGH
(2002) (identifying a Pittsburg-area VDF as a component of a cluster-based economic devel-
opment effort); Rogoway, supra note 39 (indicating that The Portland Seed Fund is an effort
to bolster a software cluster in Portland).
164. Brett Frischmann defines infrastructure as a resource that is substantially non-rival
in use and that is used as an input in production of a wide variety of private goods, public
goods, societal goods, or combinations thereof.  Infrastructure can be distinguished from a
public good.  A public good may be primarily a consumption item itself (for example, a
firework show that is broadly viewable) rather than an input in the downstream production
of other goods.  FRISCHMANN, supra note 78, at xiv.
165. It is not crucial for this analysis that VDFs are a pure public good, only that they
have the broad positive spillover effects that Porter references when discussing public goods.
Supra note 162 and accompanying text (citing Porter’s discussion of public goods); supra text
accompanying note 83 (discussing the technical definition of a public good).
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for governments to provide under general economic theory and theories of
agglomeration development.166
To understand how financing methods may create positive spillovers, it
is first necessary to understand the primary challenges of financing start-
up companies.  Financing of entrepreneurial efforts is characterized by ex-
treme uncertainty, information asymmetry, and agency costs.167  These ob-
stacles to entrepreneurial finance make it difficult for start-ups to access
traditional sources of capital.  For example, an entrepreneur who has in-
vented a new medical device will have trouble accessing most forms of
financing because her idea is novel and the course of its development is
unclear (uncertainty).  She has knowledge about the quality of her idea
and her abilities that are difficult to communicate credibly to financing
sources (information asymmetry). Also, commercializing the idea would
require leaving decisions regarding the course of the business in her hands
because she is more technologically knowledgeable than the financing
source (potential agency costs).
VC managers have been innovators in financing methods that over-
come these traditional obstacles to financing entrepreneurship.168  But in-
novators of financial technologies, like creators of other knowledge-based
products, may have difficulty capturing the full benefit of their efforts.
They create positive spillover effects by paving the way for future entre-
preneurs and investors, who can adopt the innovation at low cost.169  For
example, lawyers, accountants, and consultants who work on a successful
VC financing acquire specialized expertise they can use with other clients.
Successful VC financings also produce contracting conventions (such as
preferred stock and equity compensation terms) that streamline future ne-
gotiations in the entrepreneurial community.  Although it is initially costly
to develop and educate counterparties about VC investing practices, these
early efforts greatly facilitate future transactions.  In describing these posi-
tive spillover effects, Josh Lerner explains:
The first rationale for government intervention lies in the fact that there is a
‘virtuous cycle’ in entrepreneurship and venture capital.  Activities by pio-
neering entrepreneurs and venture capitalists pave the way for subsequent
generations: in a given city, it is far easier to recruit the staff for the one-
166. Supra text accompanying notes 83–85 (discussing how innovative technologies may
be appropriate targets of subsidies under traditional economic theory); supra note 158 and
accompanying text (discussing public goods in connection with agglomeration development).
167. George G. Triantis, Financial Contract Design in the World of Venture Capital, 68
U. CHI. L. REV. 305, 307-19 (2001) (“Financial economists regard much of security design as
the task of minimizing the cost of information. Financial intermediaries play important roles
in bridging information asymmetries and monitoring entrepreneurs on behalf of their inves-
tors.”); Cable, supra note 55, at 121–22 (citing the literature discussing uncertainty, informa-
tion asymmetry, and agency costs in the context of VC investing).
168. Triantis, supra note 167.
169. LERNER, supra note 6, at 66.
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hundreth start-up, or to find a lawyer to structure the one-hundreth financing,
than the first.170
Of course, the private VC market is now well-established and national
in reach.171  But local angel investing markets are not well developed in
many locations.  In Silicon Valley and other entrepreneurial hubs, success-
ful entrepreneurs act as angel investors and provide start-ups with capital
below minimum VC investment amounts of $5 million.  But in areas with-
out a significant history of successful start-up companies, these angel in-
vestors may not exist—resulting in a “geographic funding gap.”172  Unlike
professional venture capital, which may invest outside of its immediate
vicinity, angel investment markets tend to be extremely localized.173  It is
possible that some information regarding early-stage finance methods
could spillover from other locations (through use of lawyers from other
jurisdictions, for example), but information spillovers appear to be en-
hanced by physical proximity.174  In other words, each location needs to
develop its own angel-investing infrastructure, and this infrastructure
tends to be under-produced by markets because of positive spillover
effects.
VDFs can be understood as an effort to catalyze a local angel invest-
ment market by creating a critical mass of entrepreneurs, lawyers, ac-
countants, and investors with expertise in angel-style investing.  The hope
is that this expertise—including valuation techniques, business plan writ-
ing, due diligence practices, and financial contracting terms—will facilitate
subsequent transactions without subsidization, allowing potential industry
clusters to emerge.
As will be discussed below, however, the public goods nature of angel
investing does not entirely answer whether VDFs are a suitable tool for
agglomeration development.  Answering that question requires an appre-
ciation of where entrepreneurship and venture capital are heading.
III. WHY EFFECTIVE VDFS MAY BE INEFFECTIVE
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
This part raises concerns about VDFs, notwithstanding the arguments
in their favor described above.  Unlike previous analyses of state-spon-
sored venture capital in the financial contract literature, this article does
not criticize subsidy programs on the basis that they will fail to catalyze a
170. Id.
171. See NVCA YEARBOOK 2012, supra note 54 at 28 (showing VC investment in
nearly every state in 2011).
172. Participating Securities Hearings, supra note 6, at 54 (statement of Susan L. Pres-
ton, Director of Attorney Training and Professional Development, Davis Wright Tremaine).
173. See Brent D. Goldfarb, et al., Does Angel Participation Matter? An Analysis of
Early Venture Financing 11 (Robert H. Smith School Research Paper No. RHS 06-072, 2012),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1024186.
174. See supra text accompanying note 126–129.
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traditional angel and VC market.  That analysis has been carried out
elsewhere.175
Instead, this article assumes that VDFs may be successful in producing
more VC-ready companies.  The question this article addresses is whether
VDFs, or other local venture development programs, that are successful in
achieving that short-term goal will also succeed in achieving broader eco-
nomic development goals.  This part begins by describing changes in tech-
nology and business processes that may diminish the role of venture
capital for some entrepreneurial activity.  It then presents two specific cri-
tiques of VDFs as agglomeration development:  one based on venture cap-
ital’s appetite for high-risk and high-reward exits and another based on
venture capital’s narrow industry focus.
A. The Diverging Paths of Venture Capital and Start-ups
The universe of entrepreneurship has always been larger than the uni-
verse of companies eligible for VC financing.  Paul Kedrosky notes that
even among companies on Inc. magazine’s list of fastest-growing start-ups,
only 16 percent received VC financing.176  The amount of entrepreneur-
ship activity that is excluded from VC financing may only be getting larger
due to changes in technology, business practices, and markets that affect
start-up companies and the VC industry.  These changes underlie this arti-
cle’s critiques of venture development policies because they cast doubt on
whether a highly specialized form of financing that operates well in estab-
lished high tech centers is exportable or scalable to less established en-
trepreneurial markets.
Lean Start-ups
Today’s start-ups benefit from advances in technology that can drasti-
cally reduce operating costs.177  For example, the wide availability of cloud
computing services from large vendors like Amazon can eliminate the
need to obtain and maintain expensive equipment; open source software
can reduce development costs; and accessible sales, marketing, and distri-
bution channels like Google’s Adwords and Apple’s App Store can signifi-
cantly reduce sales and marketing budgets.178
175. See generally LERNER supra note 6; Ibrahim, supra note 6; Gilson, supra note 17.
176. Kedrosky, supra note 12, at 2.
177. Id. at 5 (“[M]ost information technology entrepreneurs say today that it costs a
fraction of what it did a decade ago to start a company.  (Much of the technology is open
source, and the cost of networking connection and bandwidth has plummeted, as has the cost
of marketing and distribution over the Internet.)”); Ibrahim, supra note 18 at [manuscript
page 107] (“In one important technology sector, software, the cost of innovation has come
down dramatically over the past decade.”).
178. Google’s AdWords allows a company to quickly develop advertising and to pay
based on the number of visits generated by the ad. Selling Products & Services Through
Adwords, SCHOOL FOR STARTUPS (July 29, 2011), http://www.schoolforstartups.co.uk/selling-
products-services-through-google-adwords/.
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Business processes are also evolving towards capital efficiency.  In his
2011 book “The Lean Startup,” Eric Reis explained methods for rapidly
shortening and reducing the expense of product development cycles.179
The main thrust of these principles is to produce the “minimally viable
product” that will generate customers, and then quickly adapt the product
based on systematic evaluation of customer behaviors.180  These principles
are a significant departure from the long and expensive product develop-
ment processes typical of the software industry, where new products and
new versions of products take years to develop.181  They have generated a
significant following in entrepreneurship circles.182
The most notable lean-start-up successes are Internet-related compa-
nies.183  But the principles are intended to be more generally applicable.
Ries provides the example of a cleantech company that substantially re-
duced capital requirements through lean-start-up companies.184
The effects of lean start-up principles are considered far-reaching.  For
one, they may reduce the risks to entrepreneurs of expensive failures.185
Instead of making large up-front investments of capital in an environment
of uncertainty, entrepreneurs and investors can assess the viability of the
product early in the venture’s lifecycle.
The extent to which inexpensive entrepreneurship affects venture capi-
tal in particular is still unclear.  Companies relying on lean start-up princi-
ples may still require VC investment, but potentially in smaller amounts or
at a later point in a company’s lifecycle.  For other companies, the reduced
capital requirements may permit forgoing venture capital altogether by
“bootstrapping” or relying on smaller angel investments.186
The Kauffman Foundation report discussed in the introduction to this
article speculated that declining costs of entrepreneurship are in part re-
179. ERIC RIES, THE LEAN STARTUP: HOW TODAY’S ENTREPRENEURSHIP USE CONTIN-
UOUS INNOVATION TO CREATE RADICALLY SUCCESSFUL BUSINESSES (2011).
180. See id. at 8–11 (summarizing lean start-up principles).
181. See The Rise of the Fleet-Footed Start-U, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Apr. 26, 2010,
2:17 AM) [hereinafter Dealbook], http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/04/26/the-rise-of-the-
fleet-footed-start-up/.
182. Ries’s book is a national best seller, and his principles have been adopted by a
number of prominent start-ups, including DropBox. See id.
183. See RIES, supra note 179, at 3–8, 97–99 (discussing extensively IMVU, a social
network company that he co-founded, and DropBox, a file-sharing company).
184. Id. at 202–04 (contrasting Alphabet Energy, which deployed a product that gener-
ated energy from waste heat with only $1 million from investors, with other clean tech com-
panies that received hundreds of millions in financing before obtaining a single customer).
185. Dealbook, supra note 181 (quoting Professor Thomas Eisenmann of the Harvard
Business School: “If it works, it will reduce failure rates for entrepreneurial ventures and
boost innovation. . . . That’s a big deal for the economy.”)
186. Id. (“[A]ccording to some Silicon Valley veterans, [adoption of lean start-up princi-
ples] means a shrinking role for venture capitalists in seeking and backing promising young
entrepreneurs.”).
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sponsible for disappointing performance by VC funds in recent years.187
It suggested “right-sizing” the VC industry to account for a declining role
in the technology sector.188
Venture Capital Swells
At the same time that start-ups are able to make do with less and avoid
some of the risk of capital-intensive product development, VC firms are
heading in a somewhat opposite direction towards larger investments and
potentially more ambitious exit goals.
The Role of Exit
VC funds target companies that appear headed towards an exit trans-
action (an acquisition by a publicly traded company or an IPO) within the
lifetime of the fund, which is normally 10 years.189  Exit is not necessarily
bad for an entrepreneur.  In fact, exit is an example of a contract term that
is “braided” because it affects and meets the needs of the entrepreneur,
the VC fund manager, and the institutional investors who provide
capital.190
For the entrepreneur and the VC fund, exit is a third-party verification
(by the market) that the period of greatest uncertainty, agency costs, and
information asymmetry has passed.  In the case of an IPO, when the start-
up company will continue as a publicly traded company, exit is the point at
which the VC fund will return control of the company to the entrepreneur
(though the entrepreneur will share control, to some extent, with public
shareholders).191
Exit also plays a role in the limited partnership contract between the
fund manager and institutional investors in the fund.  Those investors also
face uncertainty, agency costs, and information asymmetry with respect to
their investment in the fund and their relationship with the fund manager.
One way to mitigate these costs is to have fixed terms for the funds so that
performance can be occasionally evaluated and proceeds from successful
funds can be recycled into new funds established by those successful man-
agers.  Even though institutional investors may provide patient capital, in
187. See Kedrosky, supra note 12, at 5 (suggesting that the industry would be optimally
sized if committed capital were at one half its current level).
188. Id.
189. Despite the stated 10-year term of a VC fund, VC managers may ask for exten-
sions of the term and investors will often agree.  Recently, the practice has resulted in so-
called “zombie funds” that have little activity but still generate management fees.  This prac-
tice is receiving attention from regulators and sophisticated institutional investors, and is a
problem primarily when the VC managers do not intend to establish additional funds in the
future and have less regard for their reputation among investors.  Susan Pulliam & Jean
Eaglesham, Investor Hazard: ‘Zombie Funds,’ WALL ST. J. . May 31, 2012, http://online.wsj.
com/article/SB10001424052702304444604577339843949806370.html (paid subscription
required).
190. See Gilson, supra note 17, at 1091.
191. Id. at 1084–85 (noting that control-related covenants expire upon an IPO).
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that they do not demand a high degree of liquidity, periodic exits and fund
liquidation allow for recycling, periodic evaluation, and asset
reallocation.192
Exit also helps fund managers apply their skills to the stage of com-
pany where they have the most expertise.  VC funds provide significant
managerial assistance to help guide entrepreneurs through a company’s
early stages.  Once a company reaches a certain level of maturity, their
contributions may be less valuable.  Exit and fixed fund terms allow VC
managers to recycle their talents into new ventures.193
The incorporation of exit provisions into VC contracts, therefore, is a
key innovation that has allowed VC to overcome the significant obstacles
to investing in start-ups.  In this light, exit is beneficial to entrepreneurs, or
at least a palatable solution to the obstacles they face in raising capital.
Why Large Exit?
Where the interests of some entrepreneurs and fund managers may
diverge is in the size and timing of the targeted exit.194  Entrepreneurs
may be satisfied with moderate success for the company that creates hun-
dreds of jobs and doubles or triples investors’ money, but VC funds have
historically shown little interest in companies targeting this level of suc-
cess.195 VC funds seek not just exits, but especially large exits.196  In this
context, a “large exit” means an IPO or an acquisition of the company for
a large total company value (typically hundreds of millions of dollars).
There are a number of reasons for this emphasis on large exits.  For
example, start-ups need to be scalable (capable of addressing large mar-
kets) to be attractive to one class of likely acquirers, publicly traded com-
192. See id. at 1091.
193. Id.
194. See generally Robert P. Bartlett III, Venture Capital, Agency Costs, and the False
Dichotomy of the Corporation, 54 UCLA L. REV. 37 (2006) (discussing conflicts among dif-
ferent investors in connection with exit decisions).
195. Dileep Rao, Why the Venture Capital Model Is Broken, FORBES.COM (May 14,
2008), http://www.forbes.com/2008/05/14/venture-capital-financing-ent-fin-cx_dr_0514dileep
raobroken.html (discussing why venture capital does not invest in “mid-potential” ventures
that could grow in to 10–500 employees).
196. A “homerun mentality” is a well-noted feature of VC investing. See Joseph Bank-
man, The Structure of Silicon Valley Start-Ups, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1737, 1764–65 (1994)
(“Start-ups are in fact a high-risk, high-return investment.  One would expect that those who
invest in start-ups would be, while perhaps not risk-seeking, certainly less risk-averse than
most.”).
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panies.197  Similarly, a start-up must have substantial earnings growth
potential to be attractive to the public equity markets.198
The demands of institutional investors in VC funds may also drive fund
managers to chase high-risk, high-reward exits. Basil Peters, an angel in-
vestor who is critical of the effect of venture capital on entrepreneurs and
angel investors, laid out the following calculations.  As a rule of thumb,
institutional investors in VC funds expect an internal rate of return of 20%
on their investment.199  Funds are established with a ten-year term, though
this term is often extended.200  Assuming the institutional investors’ capi-
tal is tied up in the VC fund for 10 years,201 those investors need to receive
about six times their investment to achieve a 20% internal rate of return.
If one assumes that that only 20% of the fund’s portfolio companies pro-
duce a positive return,202 those successful companies need to produce an
197. Large publicly traded companies are the most likely acquirer because they can buy
a start-up in exchange for publicly traded (liquid) stock. C.f., Victor Fleischer, The Rational
Exuberance of Structuring Venture Capital Startups, 57 TAX L. REV. 137, 182-182 (2003)(cit-
ing tax-free mergers as a form of exit).
Private company (illiquid) stock would not be attractive to a VC fund, so private acquirers
would be limited to cash acquisitions.
198. See Going Public, ENTREPRENEUR, http://www.entrepreneur.com/article/52826
(last visited Nov. 28, 2012) (stating that in order to be an attractive IPO candidate, “mini-
mum earnings growth potential is 20 percent per year, and the company should be able to
achieve a valuation (total shares outstanding times their price) of at least $100 million to be
truly successful as a publicly held corporation”).
199. BASIL PETERS, EARLY EXITS: EXIT STRATEGIES FOR ENTREPRENEURS AND AN-
GEL INVESTORS (BUT MAYBE NOT VENTURE CAPITALISTS) (2009).  This number is refer-
enced elsewhere. See e.g., Rao, supra note 195 (referring to “20% hurdle rates demanded by
investors to justify the risk”).
200. Pulliam & Eaglesham, supra note 189. See also MARK J. ANSON, THE HANDBOOK
OF ALTERNATIVE ASSETS 273 (2002) (“[Venture capital l]imited partnerships are generally
formed with an expected life of 7 to 10 years with an option to extend the life another 1–5
years.”).
201. Most exits occur within a shorter time frame.  Currently, exits by merger typically
occur within 6 years of initial equity funding and exits by IPO occur within 9 years of initial
equity funding.  Jose M. Mendoza & Erik P.M. Vermeulen, The “New” Venture Capital Cycle
(part 1): The Importance of Private Secondary Market Liquidity 31 (Lex Research Topics in
Law & Economics Working Paper No. 1/2011, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1829835.  More realistic assumptions do not alter the basic point of
Peters’ illustration. Infra note 205.
202. Estimating that the bulk of investment returns are generated by 20% of portfolio
companies appears reasonable though oversimplified.  The number has appeared elsewhere.
Rao, supra note 195 (estimating that 80% of venture-backed start-ups fail).  Likely, a number
greater than 20% achieves some type of positive exit, though some positive exits are modest.
Frequently Asked Questions About Venture Capital, NAT’L VENTURE CAPITAL ASS’N, http://
www.nvca.org/index.php?Itemid=147&id=119&option=com_content&view=article (last vis-
ited Aug. 15, 2012) (“It is estimated that 40 percent of venture backed companies fail; 40
percent return moderate amounts of capital; and only 20 percent or less produce high re-
turns.”).  There is not, however, much research on performance of individual venture-backed
companies (as opposed to evaluating a fund’s performance in the aggregate).  One study of
exit transactions (i.e., considering only those companies that have achieved an exit) indicates
that 60% return less than the amount invested, less than 10% achieve an IRR of between 0
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exit that will return to the fund 30 times the fund’s investment in that
company.
Under these assumptions, funds need to chase exits that are large in
total company value.  For example, if a fund invests $10 million in a start-
up, the fund is targeting a payoff of $300 million for its individual invest-
ment (30 times its $10 million investment).  That likely requires an IPO or
acquisition at a significantly higher total company value than $300 million
(perhaps twice that amount) because any single VC fund will likely own
no more than half of the company.203
There are reasons to think Peters overstates the problem.  In fact, VC
funds make investments of varying size and at varying stages (some early
in a company’s life, and some later in a company’s life).  This practice may
mitigate the effects described above by, for example, including later-stage
investments (closer to a company’s IPO) with less uncertainty and shorter
holding periods (but likely lower rates of return).204  But even if one re-
laxes Peters’ assumptions by assuming a shorter time to exit, additional
modest exits, and staged investment, the fund in the example above must
still target exits significantly in excess of $200,000,000 in total value.205
and 24%, less than 10% achieve an IRR of between 25 and 49%, just over 10% achieve an
IRR of between 50 and 100%, and just over 10% achieve an IRR in excess of 100%.  Robert
Wiltbank, At the Individual Level: Outlining Angel Investing in the United States 8 (Univ. of
Ill. at Urbana-Champaign‘s Academy for Entrepreneurial Leadership Historical Research
Reference in Entrepreneurship, 2005), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1509255 [hereinafter Wiltbank, At the Individual Level] (citing a 2002 study by
Mason and Harrison).  A study of angel and VC investments based on records of the now-
defunct Brobeck law firm reported that approximately 40% of companies were confirmed
failures, approximately 30% had not yet achieved exit, and approximately 30% exited at a
positive value.  Goldfarb, supra note 173, at 14.  More realistic assumptions do not alter the
basic point of Peters’ illustration. See infra note 205.
203. It is reasonable to assume that no single VC fund will own in excess of 50% of the
company’s equity.  Founders and other management personnel will likely retain at least 25%
of the company’s equity. See Stever Robbins, Dividing Equity Between Investors and Foun-
ders, ENTREPRENEUR, Oct. 13, 2003, http://www.entrepreneur.com/article/65028.  The re-
maining 75% may be divided among angel investors, service providers (such as law firms)
who received equity interests in lieu of fees, and multiple VC firms.
204. For example, a backlog in the IPO pipeline following the financial crisis resulted in
a spate of late-stage investments by VC firms in recent years.  In theory, these investments
allowed funds to add shorter-term, lower-risk, and lower-reward investments to their portfo-
lios.  Given the mixed results achieved by funds using this strategy because of disappointing
IPOs, there are reasons to doubt there will be a fundamental shift towards later stage invest-
ments. See Scott Thurm & Pui-Wing Tam, Prominent Investors Miss Web IPO Payoff, WALL
ST. J., June 18, 2012, http://http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527023038364045774744
22342954922.html.
205. For example, assume that the two large exits will occur in only six years, two addi-
tional companies will exit at a modest (1.5x) value at the conclusion of the fund’s initial term,
and half of investments and capital calls are delayed until three years into the fund’s term
(i.e., they are staged).  The large exits must return in excess of $100,000,000 (10x the amount
invested) to the fund in order to produce a 20 percent IRR.  Because the fund will likely own
no more than 50 percent of the company, the total exit value must be $200,000,000.
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In a sense, this emphasis on large exit is only an arithmetic byproduct
of the targeted rate of return, high failure rates of start-up companies, and
other factors discussed below.  Theoretically, VC managers would be con-
tent investing in companies targeting smaller exits if the desired return
could be achieved through, for example, lower company failure rates or
exposure to a larger number of companies.  But ultimately the factors that
drive the focus on large exits appear unlikely to change without dramati-
cally altering the VC model.  These factors include:
• High Failure Rate: VC funds could target smaller exits if a portion of
their portfolios exhibited lower failure rates.  For example, VC funds
may occasionally have opportunities to make late-stage investments,
as many have in Facebook and other mature, but not yet public,
companies.206  But ultimately, a VC manager’s specialized skill set is
in building companies (providing managerial assistance through the
product development and growth phases).207  That means venture
capital has the greatest competitive advantage over other sources of
financing when investments are made relatively early in a company’s
life cycle.  A relatively high failure rate may be unavoidable in this
early-stage investing.
• Long Investment Horizon:  A VC manager’s company-building func-
tion also takes time to perform, so funds will invest in most portfolio
companies for a relatively long time period (it must be patient capi-
tal).  Proceeds of successful investments must be relatively large to
generate the targeted rate of return in light of the long holding
period.
• Large Investment Amount: Finally, the economics of fund manage-
ment point towards large individual investments in start-up compa-
nies. Fund managers have developed significant expertise in fields
that are historically capital-intensive, and managers would incur
costs developing new expertise.208  Also, there are clear efficiencies
in funds making fewer and larger investments.  VC funds invest sig-
nificant time in each investment, and some of this cost is “fixed” so
that a smaller investment does not require proportionately less time
than a larger investment.209  In order to achieve an acceptable return
on these large investments, the total company value of an exit must
be large.
206. Thurm & Tam, supra note 204.
207. See Gilson, supra note 17, at 1072, 1075–76.
208. See Kedrosky, supra note 12, at 7.
209. PETERS, supra note 199, at 37.
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A Long-Term Trend?
Despite difficult market conditions following the burst of the Internet
bubble and the recent financial crisis, the average VC fund size moved
from approximately $33 million in 1985 to approximately $150 million in
2011.210 A number of VC managers operate funds totaling more than $1
billion in capital commitments (typically spread over multiple funds).211
As the size of funds increases, so do the incentives to make each invest-
ment in a start-up company larger.  The average size of total investment by
VC funds per portfolio company increased from approximately $5 million
1996 to approximately $25 million in 2005.212 As a result, there is a per-
ception that venture capital’s focus on large exits is only increasing.213
B. A Critique Based on Large Exits
To some commentators, the diverging paths of venture capital and en-
trepreneurship suggest the VC model is “broken.”214  It may be, however,
that the VC market continues to serve the needs of fund managers, institu-
tional investors, and companies with capital-intensive business models.
Top VC funds, for example, did well in several recent IPOs.215  This article
discusses these trends for a different reason:  the push towards large exit
may be undesirable from an economic development standpoint.
For Employees
One reason that entrepreneurship appeals to subnational governments
as a framework for economic development is diversification of employ-
ment.  A criticism of traditional location incentives is that they concentrate
employment in a few (usually large) subsidy recipients.  For example, in
the 1970s, Pennsylvania recruited a Volkswagen facility with the expecta-
tion of 5,000 to 7,000 jobs.216  When those jobs failed to materialize, the
governor advised: “I think there is a hint of a lesson there about putting all
210. NVCA YEARBOOK 2012, supra note 54, at 18.  There has been fluctuation in fund
size over that period, and inflation accounts for some of the growth in size.  But in general,
the long-term trend appears to be towards large fund size.  Scott Shane, Venture Capital
Funds Remain Large, FORBES.COM (Jan. 11, 2012 12:52 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
scottshane/2012/01/11/venture-capital-funds-remain-large/ (showing inflation-adjusted num-
bers and discussing the difficulty of interpreting the NVCA statistics on fund size because 10-
year fund lives obscure recent trends).
211. NVCA YEARBOOK 2012, supra note 54, at 17.
212. PETERS, supra note 199, at 37 (citing National Venture Capital Association
statistics).
213. See Miguel Helft, Not the Best of Timing for the Industry’s Obituary, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 27, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/27/business/27venture.html (“The venture
business is becoming more like the movie business where a small number of hits are generat-
ing the majority of the return. . . .”).
214. See supra text accompanying notes 10–12.
215. Thurm & Tam, supra note 204 (discussing profits earned by VC firms that invested
early in Facebook and Zynga).
216. EISINGER, supra note 7, at 249.
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of your eggs in one basket.” He explained that he would rather support 50
companies with 100 employees than one company with 5,000 employ-
ees.217 Peter Eisinger argues that this sentiment motivated early efforts to
subsidize entrepreneurial finance.218 The goal, according to Eisinger, was
to encourage more businesses to start and then to help them through “the
dangerous period of infancy when business mortality rates are exception-
ally high.”219
The VC model, with its objective of large exits and correspondingly
high failure rates, may not achieve this goal.  Even among the small num-
ber of start-ups that are actually successful in obtaining venture capital,
most fail.220  There are no accurate statistics on how many companies seek
but never obtain venture capital, but it is likely the vast majority of start-
ups seeking venture capital never get that far.  When a start-up fails in
Silicon Valley and other entrepreneurial hubs, labor markets may be thick
enough to mitigate the harm to employees. One reason people are at-
tracted to Silicon Valley and similar agglomeration economies is the ability
to more easily find new employment opportunities.  Thick labor markets
function like insurance by allowing workers to pool risk.221
But for areas that do not have these thick labor markets, the VC model
may produce unstable employment, much like conventional location subsi-
dies.  This may be only a transitional problem—once a virtuous cycle of
entrepreneurship is established, labor markets may come to resemble
Silicon Valley.  But there also may be a fundamental question of Silicon
Valley’s “scalability.”  We simply do not know where the breaking point is
for establishing adequate agglomeration effects to make employment by
volatile start-ups attractive.  The concept of a “Silicon Valley lite” may be
fundamentally flawed in this respect.222
For Entrepreneurs and Angel Investors
Venture capital’s need for large exit carries with it additional risk for
entrepreneurs and local angel investors.  There may be situations, for ex-
ample, when a start-up can achieve a modest exit that provides a signifi-
cant return to the entrepreneur and early investors.  If that company has
also accepted venture capital, however, the VC fund is likely to block that
217. Id. at 242 (internal quotation marks omitted).
218. Id. at 242-43.
219. Id. at 242.
220. Wiltbank, At the Individual Level, supra note 202, at 8 (showing investment out-
comes for both VC and angel investments, and noting that over 60% result in a loss to
investors).
221. GLAESER, supra note 95, at 33.
222. Ibrahim, supra note 6, at 719–20 (using the term “Silicon Valley lite” to describe
economic development efforts geared at replicating Silicon Valley’s entrepreneurial
environment).
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beneficial exit because it is insufficient from the fund’s perspective.223  The
fund would instead prefer to risk a larger future exit event.  Indeed, re-
search on returns to angel investors suggests that subsequent VC invest-
ment increases risk to angel investors.224
In addition to increasing risk, the need for large exit may delay valua-
ble “recycling” of local capital and talent.  Entrepreneurs provide the most
value at the very start of a venture.  They conceive of innovations, articu-
late business plans, and produce prototypes or early versions of products
to prove the concept is viable.  Although some entrepreneurs retain a
leading or significant role in the company after VC funds invest, this is
often not the case.  As the company matures to the growth phase, entre-
preneurs are often replaced by more experienced managers with different
skill sets (for example, in marketing, distribution, and operations).225
Angel investors, who are often successful entrepreneurs themselves,
also provide the most value early.  They often provide mentoring to entre-
preneurs in early stages. They also leverage local networks of personal and
business contacts to identify high quality entrepreneurs at a time when the
prospects of a venture are most uncertain.226
Large exits may take the entire life of the fund to achieve.  By target-
ing exits that require long holding periods, the current VC model poten-
tially delays recycling of angel investor capital and entrepreneurial talent
into new ventures, where the specialized skills of angel investors and en-
trepreneurs are most effectively applied.227
C. A Critique Based on Narrow Industry Focus
Another potential problem with VDFs and venture development more
generally is that, despite their potential for positive spillover effects, they
support a VC model that has a very narrow industry focus.  Venture devel-
opment policies try to solve a ubiquitous market failure (the difficulty of
funding new ventures and the underproduction of finance technology to
solve this problem) with a highly specialized solution that benefits only a
narrow band of industries and only a small portion of companies within
223. See supra text accompanying notes 194–96; Ibrahim supra note 18, at 260–61 (cit-
ing Peters and describing this possibility as “investor lock-in”).
224. Robert Wiltbank and Warren Boeker compared the returns to a data set of angel
investments that were followed by VC investment to a data set of angel investments that
were not followed by VC investment.  They found that the two data sets achieved similar
overall rates of return, but the angel investors experienced more failures, fewer moderate
exits, and more large exits when VC subsequently invested.  Robert Wiltbank & Warren
Boeker, Returns to Angel Investors in Groups, Ewing Marion Kaufman Foundation, Nov.
2007, available at http://www.kauffman.org/uploadedFiles/angel_groups_111207.pdf; see also
PETERS supra note 199, at 54 (citing Wiltbank and providing anecdotal evidence).
225. PETERS, supra note 199, at 68; Ibrahim, supra note 18, at 260–61 (focusing on the
non-financial benefits entrepreneurs and angel investors receive from recycling their efforts
into new projects).
226. Cable, supra note 55, at 131 (describing angel investing practices).
227. PETERS, supra note 199, at 68 (discussing entrepreneurial recycling).
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those industries.  From this perspective, it becomes more difficult to distin-
guish VDFs from traditional location incentives.
A New Question of Agglomerative Efficiency
At first blush, the fact that VDFs have attributes of public goods and
create positive spillover effects may appear to resolve the question of their
economic efficiency.  Economists often agree that government has a role
in providing goods and services that would otherwise be undersupplied by
the market.228
Recent scholarship suggests, however, that agglomeration effects may
require an additional analysis beyond traditional measures of efficiency.
For example, local government law scholar David Schleicher recently
demonstrated how agglomerative efficiency might at times be at odds with
other measures of evaluating efficiency of government policy. In local gov-
ernment law, a primary economic framework for evaluating allocations of
power between cities and larger jurisdictions has been the “Tiebout
model,” which suggests that cities compete for residents based on levels of
taxation and public services.229  Policies are considered efficient under this
framework when they provide maximum opportunities for people to best
satisfy their individual preferences for levels of taxation and public ser-
vices.230 Schleicher refers to strong competition based on government pol-
icies as “Tiebout sorting.”231  Schleicher notes that Tiebout sorting may
enhance one kind of efficiency by satisfying preferences for tax policy and
levels of public services, but it may reduce agglomerative efficiency by dis-
torting location decisions that would otherwise be made based on factors
such as proximity to thick labor markets and related industries.232  For
example, an entrepreneur may move from an urban center to a distant
suburb in order to send her children to a particular school.  That move
may be efficient in satisfying her residential preferences, but it may con-
tribute to metropolitan sprawl that impedes agglomeration by spreading
people out.233
Similarly, supporting VDFs may be considered an efficiency-enhancing
policy because VDFs solve a market failure—the underproduction of fi-
nancing technology with positive spillover effects.  But this externality-
based analysis does not necessarily answer the question of whether these
policies encourage the emergence of agglomeration economies or instead
frustrate agglomeration effects like traditional location incentives.234
228. Oates, supra note 78.
229. Schleicher, supra note 100, at 1508–09.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 1529–34.
232. Id. at 1535–45.
233. Id.
234. This section will consider whether VDFs are agglomeratively efficient from the
sponsoring jurisdiction’s perspective.  The additional question of interjurisdictional agglom-
erative efficiency is briefly discussed infra Part IV.C.
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Narrow Solution to a Broad Problem
With the goal of agglomerative efficiency specifically in mind, one
problem is that VDFs (and venture development policies more generally)
risk violating the principles of industry neutrality that proponents of ag-
glomeration development have articulated to distinguish their policies
from traditional location incentives.235  As a result, venture development
policies at the subnational level risk creating the agglomerative distortions
attributed to traditional location incentives.  This problem results from ad-
dressing very common obstacles to financial contracting through a mecha-
nism available to a very narrow band of entrepreneurial activity.
Ubiquitous Market Failure
The obstacles to start-up finance—uncertainty, agency costs, and infor-
mation asymmetry—are present in most financing arrangements, at least
to a degree.236  These are challenges that venture capital has proven to be
adept at meeting, but they are not unique to the types of companies in
which venture capital invests.  For example, they are present in a classic
livelihood business:  a  restaurant.  A first-time restaurant owner may have
no established credit history and a novel concept (uncertainty), the restau-
rant owner may have knowledge of the local market and of his or her own
abilities that are hard to communicate to financing sources (informational
asymmetry), and the restaurant’s success will ultimately depend on the ef-
forts of the owner, which are difficult for financing sources to monitor
(agency costs).
Claims of market failures in credit markets are common.237  The SBA,
for example, guarantees loans to a wide variety of small businesses based
on a perception that banks lend at suboptimal levels to smaller
enterprises.238
As will be explained below, however, venture capital addresses these
ubiquitous obstacles for a very select set of industries and only for a select
number of businesses within those industries.  This raises the question of
whether VDFs, and venture development more generally, are consistent
with the concept of agglomerative efficiency or instead operate like a
traditional, narrowly targeted location incentive.
235. See supra text accompanying notes 144–48.
236. Triantis, supra note 167, at 307–19 (“Financial economists regard much of security
design as the task of minimizing the cost of information. Financial intermediaries play impor-
tant roles in bridging information asymmetries and monitoring entrepreneurs on behalf of
their investors.”).
237. Murray, supra note 60, at 3–9 (describing claims of funding gaps in credit markets
generally).
238. Ben R. Craig, William E. Jackson III, and James B. Thomson, Public Policy in
Support of Small Business: The American Experience 1, (Federal Reserve of Cleveland Work-
ing Paper 11-16) (explaining that there may be a failure in small business credit markets due
to information asymmetries).
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Industry Concentration
At times, venture capital can appear adaptable to a wide variety of
businesses.  It has accommodated products as diverse as semiconductors
(Intel), coffee (Starbucks), Internet search (Google), and air travel (Jet
Blue).239
On the other hand, National Venture Capital Association statistics re-
veal a consistently high level of concentration in a small number of busi-
ness types.  In 2011, nearly 80 percent of VC investment was made in six
industry sectors: software (24 percent), biotechnology (17 percent), indus-
trial/energy (12 percent), medical devices and equipment (10 percent), me-
dia and entertainment (8 percent), and IT services (8 percent).240  Those
numbers were similar two decades ago,241 except that within those sectors
both Internet-related companies and the cleantech industry have emerged
as significant recipients of VC financing.242
Some of this industry concentration is explained by the attributes of
those industries.  They are characterized by high capital requirements dur-
ing the development phase.243  This makes those companies suitable for
the larger investment sizes now typical of the VC industry.  Some have
also argued that VC firms continue their historical industry focus because
of path dependency—they have expended significant resources acquiring
industry-specific knowledge that they use to select, monitor, and provide
managerial assistance to their portfolio companies.244
Whatever the explanation, this industry concentration means that
choosing venture capital as a vehicle for economic development favors a
small number of industries.  In economic regions with activity in only one
or a small number of those industries, venture development entails the
same risk of error in predicting the path of agglomeration effects as tradi-
tional location incentives.  If policy makers have chosen to support the
wrong potential clusters, proponents of agglomeration development would
predict that resources would be wasted.  Even worse, more beneficial ag-
glomeration economies might be crowded out or neglected.245
It may be that these VC-backed industries share some unique advan-
tage in terms of economic development.  Growing any of these industries
in a region certainly would move towards the goal of a more knowledge-
based economy.  But these specific industries are not necessary to produce
239. See NVCA YEARBOOK 2012, supra note 55, at 7.
240. Id. at 12.
241. The percentages were as follows: software (22 percent), biotechnology (12 per-
cent), industrial/energy (7 percent), medical devices and equipment (11 percent), media and
entertainment (3 percent), and IT services (2 percent). Id. at 33.
242. Id. at 25 (“Clean technology was the U.S. venture capital’s most visible emerging
sector with a record $4.5 billion invested in 2011, up 15% from the 2010 total.”); id. at 39
(showing 416 Internet-related investments in 1995 versus 1,894 in 2011).
243. See Kedrosky, supra note 12, at 6.
244. Id. at 7.
245. See supra text accompanying notes 146-150.
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significant agglomeration effects.  Porter, for example, has cautioned that
all clusters within a region should be “upgraded.”246  While Porter does
recognize that certain “traded” clusters have more significant economic
impact, many traded clusters appear to have little relation to the VC in-
dustry.247  In other words, Porter does not necessarily elevate technology
companies or other VC-backed industries above other clusters.248
Under espoused principles of agglomeration development, then, the
ideal entrepreneurial finance program would be adaptable to the full
range of industries that could plausibly emerge in a given location.  Per-
haps no finance subsidy can fully realize this ideal; in a world of increas-
ingly capital-efficient entrepreneurship, venture capital appears to fall well
short.
IV. IMPLICATIONS
If the trajectory of entrepreneurship points away from venture capital
(outside of established tech centers, at least), what might emerge in its
place?  Part IV.A below considers market trends that encourage, or are
aided by, capital-efficient entrepreneurship and reduce or eliminate the
need for venture capital.  While these trends are still nascent, they demon-
strate that venture capital and entrepreneurship need not be conflated.
These market trends may be a basis for some subnational governments
to forego entrepreneurial finance subsidies.  Subsidies may be unnecessary
or may even risk crowding out helpful market trends.  Jurisdictions may
choose to spend scarce resources on services that fall more squarely within
their existing areas of competence, such as education, basic physical infra-
structure, or cultural amenities.  Or jurisdictions might eschew agglomera-
tion development altogether for an alternative strategy, like a more
laissez-faire approach emphasizing low tax rates and less restrictive
regulations.
It is unlikely, however, that entrepreneurial finance subsidies will dis-
appear based on the critiques in this article.  After all, these programs
have been part of the economic development landscape for over half a
century despite skepticism from many observers.249  Some jurisdictions
may be persuaded to adopt subsidy programs based on perceived success
stories in other jurisdictions.250  Other jurisdictions may acknowledge that
subsidy programs carry with them a high risk of error or capture by special
246. Supra note 75, at 7.
247. Supra text accompanying note 120–30 (discussing Porter’s cluster theory).
248. It could also be said that the case for viewing the VC model as “infrastructure” has
weakened as it becomes suitable as an input for a narrowing range of economic activity.
FRISCHMANN, supra note 78, at 79 (describing how a resource can loose its status as infra-
structure over time).
249. See supra text accompanying notes 5–7 (discussing the history of state-sponsored
venture capital).
250. See LERNER, supra note 6 and accompanying text (discussing the perceived success
of the SBIC program and discussing the perceived success of state-sponsored venture capital
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interests but may nonetheless feel compelled, in the current economic en-
vironment, to take the risk.251
Part IV.B therefore considers how this article’s critique, and the mar-
ket trends described below, might affect the design of entrepreneurial fi-
nance programs.  This exercise serves at least two purposes.  First, the
exercise may produce practical design suggestions that mitigate some as-
pects of this article’s critique.  Second, the exercise may reveal weaknesses
in current theories of agglomeration development to the extent some as-
pects of the critique are more or less intractable.
A. Market Trends
Early Exits
The early-exit trend builds on opportunities for capital efficiency de-
scribed in Part III above, and then advocates for smaller, quicker exits
prior to the need for venture capital.  Dr. Basil Peters, discussed above, is
the most vocal proponent of this strategy.
Peters cited data indicating that the market for acquisitions under $30
million is currently robust, and was so even during the financial crisis.252
For example, many companies currently have large cash balances due to
presumably temporary market conditions.253  Peters also claimed that
there is a longer-term trend towards buying innovation through acquisi-
tions rather than internal research and development, in part because com-
panies recognize the strengths of new firms in creating innovations.254
Part III above explains why this level of exit may be attractive to entrepre-
neurs and angel investors but may not be feasible for venture capital.255
Peters outlined how start-ups can intentionally steer towards earlier
(though smaller) exits.  For example, he believes entrepreneurs can incor-
porate this goal into a start-up’s “DNA” through terms of an equity com-
pensation plan.256
Most importantly, however, Peters warned that accepting VC invest-
ment can frustrate the goal of early exit.  He believes entrepreneurs will
in Israel); c.f. FLORIDA, supra note 21, at 298-300 (discussing Austin’s emergence as a high-
tech center).
251. Venture development policies have enjoyed increased popularity as a result of the
financial crisis. See Cable, supra note 56, at 107 (citing support for venture development in
the popular press); SBIR, SMALL BUS. INNOVATION RESEARCH, supra note 52 (discussing
proposed expansion of the SBIC program); DiSabatino, supra note 17, at 102 (“In the wake
of the recession, political demands on states to drive job growth have spurred numerous
policy responses, including focus on targeted incentives and emerging industries.”).




256. Peters suggests that a significant portion of employee equity grants should vest
only if there is an exit transaction, and that the vesting period for remaining options should
be calibrated to the expected time for an early exit (two to three years). Id. at 88.
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MPE\2-2\MPE201.txt unknown Seq: 47 13-JUN-13 13:11
Spring 2013] Incubator Cities 241
increasingly be able to forego venture capital and instead rely on smaller
angel investments because of the long-term trend towards capital effi-
ciency described above.257  Peters explained the diminished role of ven-
ture capital as follows:
Everyone has been looking for the ‘big score,’ the billion-dollar payout—the
moon shot that would vault them into the ranks of big money.  That era is
over.  Sober thinking is now the rule of the day.  The turmoil and this new way
of thinking presents a new, and possibly even more exciting, opportunity for
entrepreneurs and angel investors.  The news may not be as good for tradi-
tional venture capitalists or the companies in which they invest. . . . . A differ-
ent financing landscape for entrepreneurs has been emerging over the past
few years and will continue to evolve in this new financial climate.  This new
reality favors investment in promising young companies by angel investors,
who will often achieve an exit within a few years instead of following the risk-
ier, and much longer funding patterns of the traditional venture capital
industry.258
The early-exit strategy appears to be gaining traction with several high-
profile “super angels”—formerly successful entrepreneurs who raise small
funds to invest at levels within the funding gap.  Dave McClure, a former
PayPal executive and current super-angel, explained that his investment
fund has “a whole different set of exit criteria” than VC funds.259
While it is possible that some VC managers will adapt their investment
strategies to accommodate early exit, there are reasons to doubt a signifi-
cant shift by venture capital in this direction.  Most importantly, early exits
typically involve a smaller amount invested in each company than tradi-
tional venture capital, and managers of today’s increasingly large funds are
unlikely to find the prospect of monitoring a greater number of smaller
investments attractive.260
Revenue Loans (Royalty Funds)
Entrepreneurs are making increasing use of revenue loans. A typical
revenue loan requires the borrower to pay a fixed percentage of its reve-
nues (e.g., 2%) up to a stated multiple of the loan amount (e.g., three
times the amount borrowed).261  It therefore has attributes of both debt
257. See id. at 16–17; see also Ibrahim, supra note 18, at 107 (describing increased pos-
sibilities for financing a startup entirely through angel investors)
258. See PETERS, supra note 199, at 16-17
259. Tam, supra note 63 (“Super-angel Mr. McClure says he tends to make dozens of
small start-up bets and can comfortably make money if just a few of the start-ups are bought
by larger acquirers for less than $100 million.  In contrast, big venture funds—often sized at
several hundred million dollars and up—need bigger paydays to turn a profit on their huge
funds.”).
260. Supra text accompanying notes 208-09 (discussing the economics of fund manage-
ment); supra note 240 (discussing possible path dependence of VC managers towards capital-
intensive industries).
261. Scott Austin, An Alternative Financing Option for Startups, WALL ST. J., Dec. 2,
2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704679204575646940403312602.html.
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(in that it imposes ongoing payment obligations that are capped at a fixed
amount) and equity (in that it shares to an extent in the upside of the
business and is contingent on the business’s success).262
In recent years, different types of investors have offered revenue loans
to start-ups as an alternative to conventional equity investments.  Exam-
ples include:
• ProFounder, a “crowdfunding” website that helps an entrepreneur
arrange revenue sharing loans with family, friends, and other sources
identified through the site.263
• Light Capital (formerly “Revenue Loans”), an investment fund es-
tablished by a veteran angel investor.264
• Vision+, a $30 million fund established by a former Nokia executive
to finance the development of apps for mobile devices.265
Revenue loans fund a mix of livelihood businesses and high-growth
start-ups.266  The usefulness of revenue loans as a funding source depends
on the nature of the business.  For companies that can generate revenues
quickly because of the capital efficiencies described above, revenue loans
may be an attractive funding source because they do not dilute the entre-
preneur’s long-term equity stake in the company or require traditional in-
vestor control rights.  But for companies with business plans that require
them to spend heavily—such as to refine product development and build
brand recognition—revenue loans may not be suitable because they divert
needed cash.267
Capital Efficiency as Investment Criteria
Some investors simply use lean start-up principles, or capital efficiency
more generally, as criteria for selecting investments. For example, the Na-
tional Science Foundation (“NSF”) recently announced a series of $50,000
262. Id.
263. ProFounder shut down in 2012 because of uncertainty regarding its status as a
regulated securities intermediary.  Angus Loten, Crowd Funding Brings Unease, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 17, 2011, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240529702036114045770423
33598282986.html.
264. Courtney Rubin, 4 Start-ups Help Entrepreneurs Get Cash, INC., Sept. 21, 2011,
http://www.inc.com/news/articles/201109/new-ways-to-get-cash.html.
265. Om Malik, Why Apps Need a Different Kind of Financing, GIGAOM (Mar. 2,
2012, 10:00 AM), http://gigaom.com/2012/03/05/why-apps-needs-a-different-kind-of-vc-fund
ing/.
266. Austin, supra note 261 (describing a web-based start-up, BigDoor Media, Inc.,
funded by a mix of revenue loans, angel investments, and eventually venture capital); Rubin,
supra note 263 (describing TomatoBattle, a livelihood business that stages local events where
“people pay $50 apiece for a gigantic tomato fight”).
267. Interestingly, the idea of a state-sponsored royalty fund is not new.  In the 1970s,
Connecticut established a program that offered product development financing in exchange
for a royalty stream.  The program was considered at least a moderate success. EISINGER,
supra note 7, at 253–55.
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grants to be awarded across the country to entrepreneurs planning ven-
tures based on lean start-up principles.268  This approach acknowledges
that in many areas, entrepreneurs have to do more with less because a
robust angel and VC market does not exist.  An NSF spokesperson ex-
plained:  “We can’t replicate Silicon Valley elsewhere.  But we need to fig-
ure out a way to take some of the best practices in Silicon Valley and
deploy them elsewhere.”269
The Moderate-Growth Question
The success of the financing strategies described in this part depends in
part on whether the dichotomy between small livelihood businesses and
high-growth start-ups is outdated or incomplete.  In other words, these fi-
nancing sources are significant if there is in fact a moderate growth path
that is not as high-risk and high-reward as typically demanded by venture
capital, but that still produces companies that meaningfully affect a re-
gion’s economy through employment or building and recycling of local
risk capital.  Peter’s examples of exits in the range of $30 million suggest
there is such a middle ground.270  At least one other commentator sug-
gests there are a significant number of “mid-potential ventures” with abil-
ity employ 10 to 500 people, and that these companies are underserved by
current financing sources.271  If, on the other hand, these are simply new
ways to finance livelihood businesses, their impact may be modest.
B. Program Design Implications
The trends described above illustrate that start-up company finance is
not synonymous with venture capital.  It may be possible to fund innova-
tive efforts by entrepreneurs without steering companies toward high-risk,
high-reward business plans or favoring the relatively narrow set of indus-
tries suitable for venture capital.  Jurisdictions that decide to pursue an
entrepreneurial finance program could try to incorporate these market
trends into a subsidy program.  This Part IV.B sketches out what such
“lean finance” fund might look like and then evaluates how effectively it
addresses this article’s critiques.
Investment Terms With Broad Industry Appeal
A funding program could offer a mix of financial instruments, includ-
ing traditional angel investment terms and revenue loans.  In industries
that can take advantage of lean start-up principles and other capital effi-
ciencies, revenue loans may be attractive to entrepreneurs and may
268. Steve Lohr, With a Leaner Model, Startups Reach Further Afield, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 5, 2011, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/06/science/lean-start-ups-reach-be
yond-silicon-valleys-turf.html?pagewanted=all.
269. Id.
270. Rubin, supra text accompanying note at 263.
271. Rao, supra note 195.
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quickly begin providing returns to the funding program.  Revenue loans
and other debt instruments may also be useful to businesses that support
start-up companies, such as design firms, consultancies, and other service
businesses.
It is possible that a single type of financial instrument will prove versa-
tile enough to avoid an overly-narrow industry focus. Revenue loans, for
example, appear to fund a wide variety of businesses.272  Moreover, it is
logical to think that lean finance methods will meet the needs of a larger
number of industries than VC-oriented finance methods, if it is the case
that capital requirements are decreasing in most industries.  But until the
market for revenue loans and other alternative financing mechanisms are
better established (and understood), it would be preferable to offer entre-
preneurs a variety of financing options to ensure suitability for diverse
industries.
Investment Criteria That Reduce Risk
Whether or not a program expands beyond traditional angel invest-
ment instruments, it could still consider capital efficiency as a factor in
investment selection, like the NSF program discussed above.  Similarly, it
could state a preference for companies that demonstrate a commitment to
being acquired in three years or less (an early exit).  This commitment
could, for example, be demonstrated through the structure of the com-
pany’s equity compensation program.273
By selecting companies that can earn revenues and achieve exit
quickly, the program would potentially reduce risk to entrepreneurs and
angel investors274 and accelerate opportunities for them to recycle their
talents and capital.275  For employees, targeting quick exits may not
achieve stable employment in the conventional sense of long-term em-
ployment with a single company because an acquirer may terminate or
relocate existing employees.  But personnel compensated with equity will
profit from more frequent positive exits.  And ultimately employment
markets should benefit from high levels of successful entrepreneurial ac-
tivity and resulting agglomeration economies.
Governance
To be consistent with agglomeration development principles, the goal
of a subsidy program should be to establish new entrepreneurial finance
technology that is suitable to the existing and emerging strengths of the
local business environment. Accordingly, there is benefit to leaving opera-
272. Supra note 265.
273. Supra note 256 (discussing Peters’ suggestions for targeting early exit).
274. Supra text accompanying note 258 (asserting that VC financing imposes additional
risk on angel investors and entrepreneurs); supra text accompanying note 224 (citing empiri-
cal evidence of increased risk to angel investors as a result of subsequent VC investment);
supra note 185 (asserting that lean start-up principles reduce risk to entrepreneurs).
275. See supra text accompanying notes 225–27 (discussing entrepreneurial recycling).
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tion of the programs and design details to private managers who are in the
best position to discern local demand.  The role of economic development
officials would be to solicit proposals from potential fund managers.  Local
business leaders and organizations could be involved in evaluating and se-
lecting these proposals for design and management of the fund.  Hope-
fully, the selected private managers would use the subsidized programs as
blueprints for subsequent and sustained private investment.  To that end,
the program could require that public funds be matched with private in-
vestor funds.276
One potential benefit of the lean finance approach outlined above is
that it facilitates compensation of program managers through a share of
investment returns.  The manager of a program that emphasizes early exits
or uses revenue loans can receive a percentage of royalties or early-exit
proceeds.  Payouts could commence relatively early in the life of the fund
(as soon as companies start generating any revenues or achieve an early
exit).  In contrast, compensating managers of venture-capital-oriented
VDFs through a share of investment returns is problematic.277  VC-style
investments take a long time to produce returns and have high failure
rates, resulting in delayed and highly contingent payouts.  Professional
managers of large VC funds—who are compensated largely through a
share of investment returns—mitigate these risks somewhat by exposure
to a large volume of investments.  But this strategy may not be available to
managers of modestly-sized VDFs limited to investing in VC-ready com-
panies in one economically underperforming region.
A Template
The Portland Seed Fund employs, or contemplates, several of the fea-
tures described above.  It was established under the guidance of a commit-
tee of local business leaders and is operated by private managers receiving
incentive-based compensation.278  It expressly includes capital efficiency
among its investment criteria.279  The fund initially contemplated investing
through revenue loans, though it appears to have abandoned that plan.280
Currently, it invests through convertible notes, which are typical of VDFs
and ordinarily contemplate subsequent venture capital (or traditional an-
gel) investment.281  Despite this divergence from the above recommenda-
276. LERNER, supra note 6, at 183 (recommending private matching funds).
277. See DiSabatino supra note 17, at 99 (“[S]tate-run venture capital funds run the risk R
of performing poorly because of an inability to provide competitive compensation packages
to attract top talent. .”).
278. Rogoway, supra note 35.
279. FAQs, supra note 36.
280. Mike Rogoway, Portland Seed Fund Pledges Tough Love for Entrepreneurs, OR.
LIVE BLOG, October 2, 2010, http://www.oregonlive.com/business/index.ssf/2010/10/portland_
seed_fund_pledges_tou.html (discussing use of revenue loans); FAQs, supra note 36 (discuss-
ing use of convertible notes).
281. Scott Edward Walker, Everything You Ever Wanted to Know About Convertible
Note Seed Financings But Were Afraid to Ask, TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 7, 2012), http://tech
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tions, the Portland Seed Fund’s future performance may be instructive
because of its emphasis on capital efficiency.
Are Design Modifications Enough?
How likely is it that the design suggestions above will address this arti-
cle’s critiques based on large exit and lack of industry neutrality?  These
design modifications could substantially mitigate problems related to high-
risk exit strategies.  The market trends discussed above are at least anec-
dotal evidence that a lean-finance approach could reduce risk and still pro-
vide sufficient incentives to entrepreneurs and local angel investors to
invest time and money in innovative products and business plans.
It is less clear, however, that design modifications will meaningfully
address concerns about industry neutrality.  It is possible that lean finance
options will prove adaptable to a wider range of industries than venture
capital.282  But finance methods often specialize to meet the needs of spe-
cific industries.283  Subsidized lean finance methods might prove especially
useful to app designers but not clean energy companies.  While a sponsor-
ing jurisdiction can design a program to be initially open-ended and re-
sponsive to emerging local demand,284 in a world of scarcity a sponsoring
jurisdiction necessarily makes choices about a program’s scope that affect
which industries benefit.  In fact, the same can be said of most suggested
roles for government in agglomeration development efforts.285
Perhaps proponents of agglomeration development have more work to
do in distinguishing their strategies from conventional location subsidies.
Presently, it appears difficult for economic development officials to deter-
mine which policies respect and which policies violate the principle of in-
dustry neutrality.  It is not enough, for example, to limit the role of
government to providing public goods or goods that produce externali-
ties.286  As discussed above, VDFs may technically have attributes of pub-
lic goods and may produce positive externalities, but in context they may
not be industry-neutral.
crunch.com/2012/04/07/convertible-note-seed-financings/ (“A convertible note is short-term
debt that converts into equity.  In the context of a seed financing, the debt typically automati-
cally converts into shares of preferred stock upon the closing of a Series A round of
financing.”).
282. See supra, text accompanying note 8 (discussing anecdotal evidence of lean fi-
nance’s broad industry appeal).
283. Austin, supra note 261 (discussing how revenue loans were initially developed for
the mining, film production, and drug industries).
284. Infra text accompanying note 284 (discussing design features intended to respond
to local demand).
285. For example, a sponsoring jurisdiction could focus on convening stakeholders, pro-
viding local economic information, and supporting educational institutions. See supra text
accompanying notes 160–66. But that jurisdiction must still decide which stakeholders to con-
vene, what information to provide, and which educational institutions to support.
286. See note 162 (discussing Porter’s suggestion that governments focus on externality-
producing goods and services).
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C. Future Analysis
Before concluding, this section identifies issues that this article could
not fully analyze (while keeping its scope manageable) but that may be the
subject of future analysis by legal scholars.
Interjurisdictional Welfare
This article considers VDFs from the perspective of the sponsoring ju-
risdiction, not from a national or international perspective.  In other
words, this article adopts an intrajurisdictional perspective rather than an
interjurisdictional perspective.  It is possible, however, that VDFs and
other subnational agglomeration development efforts benefit the sponsor-
ing jurisdiction (the intrajurisdictional perspective) but are agglomera-
tively inefficient to society as a whole (the interjurisdictional perspective),
by drawing economic activity and resources away from a superior cluster
in an alternate jurisdiction.287  For example, had Boston retained
Facebook, it might have created a net benefit for Boston but also impeded
the growth of Facebook and Silicon Valley to an even greater extent.  Al-
ternatively, agglomeration development may in fact be agglomeratively ef-
ficient on an interjurisdictional basis by revealing nonobvious
agglomerative advantages in a particular region.288  Finally, considerations
of geographic equity (a desire that no region be “left behind” in the transi-
tion to a knowledge-based economy) may warrant agglomeration develop-
ment despite any inefficiency.289
The interjurisdictional perspective turns on questions that are currently
unresolved on a theoretical and empirical basis.  Evaluating interjurisdic-
tional efficiency would require knowing whether returns to developing
nascent clusters exceed returns to further growth of mature clusters.290
Interjurisdictional Cooperation
In fact, referring to a single “sponsoring jurisdiction” of an agglomera-
tion development effort is an oversimplification.  Agglomeration effects
occur within regions that span multiple local governments.291 This creates
287. C.f. Enrich, supra note 134, at 423 (“[Tax] incentives subvert the allocative func-
tions of the market and divert business activity from its economically most efficient
location.”).
288. Gillette, supra note 134, at 486–87.
289. C.f. Edward L. Glaeser & Joshua D. Gottlieb, The Economics of Place-Making
Policies 5 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14373, 2008), available at
http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/glaeser/files/bpeatype2b.pdf, (“Of course, any ten-
dency to artificially subsidize those areas with high human capital would seem inequitable.”).
290. Id. at 5 (“There is little clear evidence that human capital spillovers or industrial
spillovers differ between smaller or larger, or more or less dense, cities.”).
291. JARED, supra note 119, at 3 (“Clusters basically never really conform to a politi-
cal jurisdiction such as a single county municipality, city, town etc. Indeed, a cluster may
overlap several states and a cluster region can be quite large composed of many counties.
Given that most [economic development organizations] are derived from jurisdictions, the
existence of a cluster creates some obvious awkward complexities . . .”).
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legal and practical impediments to crafting unified agglomeration develop-
ment policies, implicating the difficulty of interlocal cooperation in frag-
mented metropolitan areas.292
Accountability Measures
Besides advocating for incentive-based compensation for VDF manag-
ers, this article does not address how a sponsoring jurisdiction may try to
mitigate problems of incompetency and capture typically associated with
subsidy programs.293  In the context of traditional conventional subsidies,
a variety of accountability measures have been employed, including consti-
tutional limitations on investing in private companies,294 judicial oversight
through the “public use” doctrine,295 and claw-back statutes requiring re-
payment of subsidies that fail to produce expected jobs.296  It will be chal-
lenging to craft similar accountability measures in the context of VDFs
and agglomeration development more generally.  For example, a claw-
back statute would encounter functional problems in the context of start-
ups because of high failure rates.  Entrepreneurs are likely unwilling to
promise job-creation outcomes, and failed start-ups would be unable to
pay back funds.
More broadly, it is difficult to evaluate a program’s success.  It is meth-
odologically difficult to determine whether a state-sponsored venture capi-
tal program can in fact claim credit for creating specific jobs at a portfolio
company or whether those same jobs would have been created without
program’s investment.297  It is even more difficult to ascertain whether a
program satisfies a more attenuated, but arguably more crucial, goal of
creating new financing infrastructure to support agglomeration effects.
Over time, it may be possible to find correlation between positive eco-
nomic data and agglomeration development policies, but it will likely re-
main difficult to establish causation between particular policies and
economic outcomes.
292. For a discussion of this difficulty, see generally.GERALD E. FRUG, CITY MAKING:
BUILDING COMMUNITIES WITHOUT BUILDING WALLS 132-38 (1999).
293. Supra text accompanying notes 75-77 (discussing typical objections to subsidy
programs).
294. Supra note 40 (discussing state constitutional provisions that affected the design of
the Portland Seed Fund); David E. Pinsky, State Constitutional Limitations on Public Indus-
trial Financing: An Historical and Economic Approach, 111 U. PA. L. REV. 265, 277-82 (1962-
1963) (discussing typical state constitutional provisions affecting subsidy programs).
295. Richard Briffault, The Disfavored Constitution: State Fiscal Limits and State Con-
stitutional Law, 34 RUTGERS L. J. 907, 910-15 (2003).
296. LaFave, supra note 131 (discussing claw-back statutes).
297. LERNER, supra note 6, at 142–61 (discussing the difficulties of evaluating state-
sponsored VC programs).
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Distributional Concerns
Agglomeration development has been criticized for benefitting highly
educated high-tech workers and wealthy investors.298  This may make ag-
glomeration development undesirable or politically untenable.  Perhaps
the lower-cost forms of entrepreneurship discussed in this article are more
accessible and therefore more palatable than traditional agglomeration
development.
CONCLUSION
This article argues that entrepreneurial-finance policy is at a cross-
roads. State-sponsored venture capital was an initial effort to shift eco-
nomic development away from particularly capital-intensive
manufacturing businesses towards relatively more nimble and innovative
start-up companies.299  Now that the trend toward capital efficiency is ac-
celerating and venture capital is maturing, it may be time to revisit the role
of venture capital in public policy.  Particularly in those places that least
resemble Silicon Valley—in other words, the places most likely to engage
in significant economic development efforts along these lines—there is a
need for new financing technology that takes advantage of entrepreneurs’
ability to do more with less.  This article considers what that technology
might look like, and provides initial thoughts on whether government can
play a helpful role in establishing it.
More broadly, this article underscores an important feature of the bur-
geoning field of law and entrepreneurship scholarship.300  Policies that
harness private entrepreneurial efforts to achieve public economic devel-
opment goals lie at the intersection of diverse areas of legal expertise, such
as tax, intellectual property, and public finance.  In particular, evaluating
VDFs requires bridging two normally distant corners of the law review
literature:  financial contract design and local government law.  The finan-
cial contract literature is helpful in understanding why VC contracts may
fail to adapt to a changing environment for entrepreneurship.  But fully
evaluating VDFs also requires examining them specifically as creatures of
state and local government law.  Determining whether other entrepre-
neurship policies meet their public goals likely requires a similar synthesis
of more cabined analyses in specialized fields.
298. See MCGAHEY, supra note 90, at 9–10.
299. EISINGER, supra note 7, at 241 (“[S]mall businesses . . . seemed well-suited to struc-
tural changes occurring in the patterns of economic activity.  The declining importance of
economies of scale in the less capital-intensive industries dependent on advanced technology,
the growing tendency to contract out the manufacture of component parts to independent
suppliers, and the need for more flexible production and management systems to respond to
the competitive challenges of rapid product innovation all suggested not only a role but also
the necessity of a strong small business sector and a public policy matrix to support it.”).
300. For a valuable discussion of law and entrepreneurship, see supra note 67.
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